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Texto de origen - inglés Presentation
PRESENTACIÓN
Síntesis: “en cada espacio debe leerse arquitectura…
…nuestro cometido”
Fruto de la unión de dos profesionales, la arquitecta Karina Lenzano y el ingeniero Carlos Díaz, fundamos el estudio “kck arquitectura”, para desarrollar nuestra actividad profesional, como continuación de una amplia experiencia individual en los campos de la arquitectura, la ingeniería, el paisajismo, el urbanismo, el interiorismo, el diseño industrial y la imagen corporativa. Actualmente nos hemos consolidado como un estudio pionero, con prioridades muy marcadas de servicio al cliente y con la excelencia en el producto final como única meta.
Durante todos estos años no hemos hecho sino crecer, como personas y como profesionales consolidados. La ilusión que ponemos en nuestros trabajos no tiene límite, nuestro objetivo es ofrecerte siempre algo más de lo que pudieras esperar, superar tus expectativas.
Nos esforzamos en atesorar colaboradores profesionales especializados para poder ofrecer un servicio integral “llaves en mano” organizado e impecable. Nuestro equipo formado por especialistas en diseño interior, en diseño gráfico, en paisajismo, arquitectura e ingeniería, nos permiten ser el único interlocutor que necesitas para la gestión de tu proyecto, asumiendo tus necesidades como propias para así poderte ofrecer la solución idónea tanto desde la perspectiva funcional, como estética y presupuestaria, llevando la responsabilidad de la ejecución y su coordinación hasta los detalles finales del acabado.
La comunicación se convierte en eje vertebrador de nuestra interacción con vosotros, y desde mucho antes que vuestro proyecto vea la luz, nos marcamos el objetivo de que lo podáis sentir, que os podáis emocionar, para así conseguir que disfrutéis día a día de la ilusión que habéis depositado en él, y como no en nosotros para poderos ayudar.
Nos apasiona nuestro trabajo. La sensibilidad, la flexibilidad y el rigor son la base de nuestro estilo. No te vamos a dejar indiferente, vamos a realizar un proyecto único para ti. Nos encantan los retos.
FILOSOFÍA
…el proceso…
Cada encargo, por pequeño que sea, requiere de todo un proceso creativo que comienza por la percepción de múltiples sensaciones al contemplar el espacio, se suceden así una secuencia de imágenes, colores, sonidos, olores, el entorno próximo y lejano. Surge así una idea la cual se plasma en un papel, evoluciona de la mano del cliente y finalmente se transforma en una realidad a ser vivida. El resultado deja una impronta que modifica tanto el paisaje interior como exterior, y queda grabado en la memoria colectiva como parte de una nueva realidad…
Este proceso tiene que ver con un programa de nesecidades concreto para cada cliente. Es nuestra prioridad además, la constante evolución e innovación
…la arquitectura no se cuenta con palabras, se DISFRUTA y se LEE en imágenes… se VIVE en espacios hechos a medida de cada necesidad… espacios que envuelven una realidad diferente para cada persona…
SERVICIOS
Síntesis:
“…una correcta organización y planificación permite optimizar con eficiencia las variables tiempo y presupuesto, lo que sumado a un seguimiento permanente de la obra, garantiza la calidad de acabados y la fiel ejecución de la idea proyectada…
-Proyectos: áreas de actuación
Arquitectura sostenible y energías renovables
Edificación residencial y pública
Planificación urbana (planes generales, planes parciales…)
Complejos turísticos y hoteleros
Rehabilitación.
Teatros y complejos socio-culturales.
Clínicas, hospitales y consultorios privados.
Industrias y fábricas.
Puertos deportivos, clubes y complejos recreativos.
Restaurantes, discotecas, cafeterías y pubs.
Countries y fincas suburbanas.
Arquitectura del paisaje.
Diseño de escenografías e iluminación para espectáculos, televisión y cine.
Ampliación, acondicionamiento y reformas.
Proyectos de decoración e interiorismo.
Diseño de Stands.
Diseño de mobiliario.
-Dirección de Obra
-Ejecución de Obra
-Tasaciones y Peritajes
-Diseño e imagen corporativa
Imágenes 3D
Animación 3D
Diseño Web
Diseño gráfico
Palabras sueltas del menú:
El estudio= The study
Presentación= Presentation
Filosofía= Philosophy
Servicios= Services
Contacto= Contact
Ubicación= Location
Correo= Postal address
Correo electrónico= mail address
Telefono= Phone number
Asunto= Subject
proyectos=projects
arquitectura=architecture
viviendas unifamiliares= one family housing
edificios plurifamiliares= multifamily buildings
ampliación y reforma= extensión and reform
edificios públicos=public buildings
interiorismo= interior works
paisajismo=landscape
urbanismo=town planning
diseño= design
infografías= infografia
perspectivas exteriores= external outlook
perspectivas interiores= interior perspectives
plantas distribución= distribution plants
planos axonométricos= axonometric drawings
animación 3d= 3d animation
diseño web= web design
diseño gráfico=graphic
área clientes= customer area
Traducción - español Presentation
Summary:
“Each space should read “architecture...our objective”
As a result of the joint of two professionals, architect Karina Lenzano and engineer, Carlos Díaz, founded “ kck architecture” studio. The aim is to develop our professional activity, as a continuation of our individual wide experience, in the fields of architecture, engineering, landscaping, town planning, interior design, industrial design and corporate image. At present, we are consolidated as pioneers, with very clear priorities for customer service, and with the search for excellence in the final product as our sole goal.
During all these years, we have been growing constantly, as human beings and consolidated professionals. The illusion we work with is far-reaching. Our main objective is to offer you more than what you can expect, we want you to exceed your expectations.
We make great effort to treasure especialized professional collaborators to be able to give you a complete flawless organized “turnkey system” service. Our team which is composed of interior and graphic designers, landscaping, architecture and engineering specialists, allows us to be the only interlocutor you need to carry out your projects. In order to offer you a suitable solution from a functional as well as from an esthetic and budgetary point of view, we assume your needs as ours and we take the responsibility for the execution and its coordination till the final details of the accomplished work.
Communication becomes the core of the interaction between you and us, Much longer before your project is ready, we want you to feel it, to get excited about it, so that, day after day, you can enjoy the hope you have put on it and why not on us to help you.
We do our job with great passion. Sensitivity, flexibility and rigor are the basis of our style. You are going to be an active participant in the project, which will be a unique one. We love challenges.
Our phylosophy
… the process
Each demand, no matter how simple it may be, requires a creative process that starts by the perception of multiple sensations while observing the space. Thus, a sequence of images, colors, sounds, smells, the nearby and far away surroundings start to flow. So an idea is born, it is translated into paper, it is developed together with the client and finally, it becomes a real piece of work to be lived. The result is a stamp that modifies the urban landscape and is recorded in the collective memory as part of a new reality. This process has to do with a concrete need program suitable for each client. Constant evolution and innovation are also our priority.
”…the art of architecture is not told with words it is enjoyed, it is read in images…, it is lived in ready-made spaces to the measure of each different need…, spaces that involve a different reality for each person.
SERVICES
Summary:
“…a correct organization and planning allow us to optimize time and budget variables efficiently, which together with a permanent control of the building site, guarantees the quality of the final details and the strict execution of the original idea.
-Projects: Working areas
Sustainable architecture and renewable energy.
Residential and public building
Urban planning (general planning, partial planning…)
Hotel and turistic facilities
Rehabilitation
Socio-cultural facilities and theatres
Clinics, hospitals and prívate consulting rooms.
Factories and industries
Marinas, clubs and places for leisure activities.
Restaurants, discos, cafes and pubs
Gated communities and suburban farms
Shops and comercial centers
Landscape architecture
Scenery design and illumination for shows, television and cinema.
Extension, conditioning and reforms
Decoration and interior work projects.
Stall designs
Furniture design
-Work Management
Work execution.
- Pricing and expert´s work
-Corporate image and design
3D images
3D animation
Web design
Graphic design
Palabras sueltas del menú:
El estudio= The study
Presentación= Presentation
Filosofía= Philosophy
Servicios= Services
Contacto= Contact
Ubicación= Location
Correo = Postal address
Correo electrónico= mail address
Telefono= Phone number
Asunto= Subject
proyectos=projects
arquitectura=architecture
viviendas unifamiliares= one family housing
edificios plurifamiliares= multifamily buildings
ampliación y reforma= extensión and reform
edificios públicos=public buildings
interiorismo= interior works
paisajismo=landscape
urbanismo=town planning
diseño= design
infografías= infografia
perspectivas exteriores= external outlook
perspectivas interiores= interior perspectives
plantas distribución= distribution plants
planos axonométricos= axonometric drawings
animación 3d= 3d animation
diseño web= web design
diseño gráfico=graphic
área clientes= customer area
español al inglés: proofreading General field: Jurídico/Patentes Detailed field: Derecho: (general)
Texto de origen - español
SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LEGAL ROLE OF THE SENTENCES AND RECOMENDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES CREATED FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Zlata Drnas de Clément*
ABSTRACT: This article aims to reflect about the role of pronouncements of the various specialized bodies for the protection of human rights and legal meaning and scope of the "weight” assigned by the International Court of Justice in the Case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) -sentence of 30 November 2010- to the interpretations adopted by the independents bodies that was established specifically to supervise the application of human rights treaty.
KEY WORDS: Human rights specialized bodies – Role of the pronouncements – Universalization.
The International Court of Justice in the Case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) -sentence of 30 November 2010- referred to the "jurisprudence" (“case law”) of the Human Rights Committee and ruled that “(a)lthough the Court is in no way obliged, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation of the Covenant [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] on that of the Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent body that was established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty.”
This leads us to reflect about the role of pronouncements of the various specialized bodies for the protection of human rights and legal meaning and scope of the "weight” assigned by the Court to the interpretations of human right’s instruments by expert entities.
Some international bodies created for the protection of human rights
Universal Level
The United Nations Human Rights Council (subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly established in 2006, successor of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights) is an inter-governmental body of 47 States responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and make recommendations on them (specific country situations or thematic issues). The format of the outcome of the review will be a report consisting of a summary of the proceedings of the review process; conclusions and/or recommendations, and the voluntary commitments of the State concerned. Special procedures may be individual ("Special Rapporteur" or "Independent Expert") or a working group usually composed of five members (one from each region). In 2007, the Human Rights Council decided to create an Advisory Committee of eighteen members to provide expert advice and adopted a new Complaint Procedure, established to address consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of all human rights and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any part of the world.
The Human Rights Committee -the principal quasi-judicial human rights body within the U.N. human rights system- has 18 independent experts who are persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights that monitors implementation by its State parties of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, in force from 23 March 1976). States must report initially one year after acceding to the Covenant and then whenever the Committee requests (usually every four years). The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations, generally divided into the following sections: Introduction, Positive factors, and Principal subjects of concern and recommendations. In addition to the reporting procedure, article 41 of the Covenant provides for the Committee to consider inter-state complaints, and under First Optional protocol, individual complaints. The Committee also publishes its interpretation of the content of human rights provisions, known as general comments.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is the body of 18 independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by its States parties. All States parties submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially within two years of accepting the Covenant and thereafter every five years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. With regard to individual complaints, in 2008, the General Assembly adopted an Optional Protocol (GA resolution A/RES/63/117) to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which provides the Committee competence to receive and consider communications. The Committee transmits its findings to the State Party concerned together with comments and recommendations. The Committee publishes its interpretation of the provisions of the Covenant, known as general comments.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) is the oldest body created for the protection of human rights. It has 18 independent experts that monitor implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by its State parties. States parties are obliged submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially one year after acceding to the Convention and then every two years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. The Convention establishes three other mechanisms through which the Committee performs its monitoring functions: the early-warning procedure, the examination of inter-state complaints and the examination of individual complaints. The Committee includes in its annual report a summary of the communications and, where appropriate, a summary of the explanations and statements of the States Parties concerned and of its own suggestions and recommendations. The Committee also publishes its interpretation of the content of human rights provisions (general recommendations or general comments).
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is the body of 23 independent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. States parties are obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights of the Convention are implemented. During its sessions the Committee considers each State party report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. In accordance with the Optional Protocol to the Convention, the CEDAW receive communications from individuals or groups of individuals. These procedures are optional and are only available where the State concerned has accepted them. The Committee also formulates general recommendations and suggestions.
The Committee Against Torture (CAT) is the body of 10 independent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by its State parties. States parties submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially one year after acceding to the Convention and then every four years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. The Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“SPT”), composed of 25 independent and impartial experts, started in 2007 pursuant the Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture. Is a new kind of treaty body with purely preventive mandate (visits, assessment, advices). It produces recommendations and observations to Sates.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the body of 18 independent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by its State parties. It also monitors implementation of two optional protocols to the Convention, on involvement of children in armed conflict and on sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. On 19 December 2011, the UN General Assembly approved a third optional protocol on a Communications Procedure, which will allow individual children to submit complaints regarding specific violations of their rights under the Convention and its first two optional protocols. The Protocol opens for signature in 2012 and will enter into force upon ratification by 10 UN Member States. States parties submit regular reports to the Committee initially two years after acceding to the Convention and then every five years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations.
The Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW) is the body of 14 independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families by its State parties. States parties submit regular reports to the Committee initially one year after acceding to the Convention and then every five years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. The Committee also, under certain circumstances, is able to consider individual complaints or communications from individuals claiming that their rights under the Convention have been violated once 10 States parties have accepted this procedure in accordance with article 77 of the Convention. At the moment, two States have accepted this procedure.
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is the body of 12 (later 18) independent experts which monitors implementation of the Convention by the States Parties. States parties submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially within two years of accepting the Convention and thereafter every four years. The Committee examines each report and shall make suggestions and general recommendations on the report. The Optional Protocol to the Convention gives the Committee competence to examine individual complaints with regard to alleged violations of the Convention by States parties to the Protocol. After examining a communication, the Committee shall forward its suggestions and recommendations, if any, to the State Party concerned and to the petitioner.
The Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) is the body of 10 independent experts which monitors implementation of the Convention by the States Parties. States must report initially within two years of accepting the Convention. The Committee examines each report and shall make such suggestions and general recommendations on the report. A State Party may at the time of ratification of the Convention or at any time afterwards declare that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by this State Party of provisions of this Convention. The Committee produces comments, observations or recommendations.
Regional level
Europe
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a court established in 1959 by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and hears complaints that a contracting state has violated the human rights enshrined in the Convention and its 14 protocols.
It consists of a number of judges equal to the number of member States of the Council of Europe. The Court’s judges sit in their individual capacity and do not represent any State. In dealing with applications, the Court is assisted by a Registry consisting mainly of lawyers from all the member States (who are also known as legal secretaries). They are entirely independent of their country of origin and do not represent either applicants or States.
The Court receives complaints by individuals or other contracting states. The Convention was adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe and all of its 47 member states are parties to the Convention. In final judgments the Court declares that a contracting state has violated (or not) the Convention, and may order to the State to pay material and/or moral damages and the legal costs of the case. The Convention states that Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. Advisory opinions are not binding, regardless of legal weight in the system they have.
America
The legal regime to which the organs of the inter-American system of protection of human rights must adhere is based on the declaration of the fundamental human rights in the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and -as a result of progressive efforts during the twentieth century-, a sui generis system has been completed by: the American Convention on Human Rights; the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty; the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons; the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities. However, the Charter and the Convention are the only instruments that establish rules of due process for the proceedings of the system’s organs (Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court). The other instruments refer to the Convention with regard to everything that concerns proceedings. The OAS Charter establishes the powers and competence of the Commission. So, in the case of the OAS Member States not parties to the Convention, the due process regime refers the administration of requests and communications to Articles I, II, III, IV, XVIII, XXV and XXVI of the American Declaration, based on the provisions of Article 24 of the Statute of the Commission which, in turn, refers to its Rules of Procedure. In the case of the parties to the Convention, the competent organs are the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Both the Commission and the Court -in different ways- are empowered to interpret the Convention. The Commission is an organ of the OAS; but, it is also an organ of the American Convention, and its powers are established in Article 41 of this instrument. As an organ of the Convention, the Commission is linked to the Court, because both have the authority to examine individual and State communications in accordance with Articles 44, 45, 51, 61 and ff. of the Convention, though in different ways. Only in the mentioned area, the Court has the power to review whether the Commission has complied with the provisions of the American Convention and the different inter-American human rights instruments. The Inter-American Court controls due process of law in the proceedings before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in relation to the processing of matters that have been submitted to the Court’s consideration, in accordance with the competence granted to it by the American Convention and other inter-American instruments for the protection of human rights. In the other areas the Commission and the Court have autonomy and functional independence.
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) is a principal and autonomous organ of the OAS, created in 1959, composed of seven independent members. Together with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Commission is one of the institutions of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR, Pacto of “San José-Costa Rica”).
The Commission exercises three types of function with the basic purpose of the promotion, observance and protection of human rights: (i) administrative; (ii) advisory and promotional, and (iii) quasi-jurisdictional, as set forth in Articles 44 to 51 of the Convention.
The Commission makes requests or recommendations to the governments of the member states, prepares studies or reports, and issues conclusions.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (seven judges, nationals of the member states of the OAS) is the judicial organ of the American Convention on Human Rights, established in San José-Costa Rica, in 1979.
The Court enforces and interprets the provisions of the ACHR through its adjudicatory and advisory functions. Only the States Parties and the Commission have the right to submit a contentious case to the Court.
The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of the ACHR that are submitted to it, provided that the States parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration, or by a special agreement.
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by the ACHR, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of the right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.
The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. The judgment of the Court is final and not subject to appeal (admits only interpretation at request). The advisory function of the IACtHR enables it to respond to consultations submitted by agencies and member states of the OAS (advisory opinion on domestic laws and proposed legislation, and whether or not they are compatible with the Convention's provisions).
Africa
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The African Charter established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (eleven members) to promote, protect, interpret the rights enshrined under the Charter, and to ensure that member states comply with their obligations undertaken under the Charter. The Commission was inaugurated on 2 November 1987. Later the Commission was charged also with the functions of protection and promotion of human and peoples' rights and the interpretation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Commission produces reports and recommendations.
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The Court (eleven judges) was established by virtue of Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted by Member States of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June 1998. It has jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.
The Court complements the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights conferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
The Court’s jurisdiction applies only to states that have ratified the Court’s Protocol.
The Court may receive complaints and/or applications submitted to it either by the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights or State parties to the Protocol or African Intergovernmental Organizations. Non-Governmental Organizations with observer status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and individuals from States which have made a Declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court can also institute cases directly before the Court. The judgment of the Court shall be final and not subject to appeal At the request of a Member State of the OAU, the OAU, any of its organs, or any African organization recognized by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the Commission.
The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights is seized with matters of interpretation arising from the application or implementation of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) adopted en 1990, established the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (eleven members), i.a. to promote and protect the rights enshrined in the ACRWC; to monitor the implementation and ensure protection of the rights enshrined in the Charter; to interpret the provisions of the Charter at the request of a State Party, an Institution of the Organization of African Unity or any other person or Institution recognized by the Organization of African Unity, or any State Party. The Committee monitors the implementation of the Charter and may receive communication, from any person, group or non-governmental organization recognized by the OAU, by a Member State, or the United Nations relating to any matter covered by the Charter. As final outcome, produces reports.
Some partial reflections
As we can see, courts except, the different bodies has merely recommendatory or informative role and are not able to produce genuine jurisprudence.
Some domestic tribunals have recognized the binding value of the pronouncements of quasi - judicial bodies and have called “jurisprudence” their resolutions.
José Ovalle Favela remembers that Norberto Bobbio stated that the activities of international organizations for the protection of human rights can be considered under three aspects: the promotion (set of actions that aim to induce states to introduce or improve internal regulation), the control (set of international measures put in place to check whether the recommendations have been accepted and to what extent), and the ensuring (real organization of jurisdictional international protection). Some quasi-judicial bodies interpret the law with guarantees similar to those of the courts.
As Thomas Buergenthal noted, the system has its built-in limitations: the initial step rests with the states, which must first ratify or accede to a legally binding instrument; the system continually requires at least some level of voluntary cooperation by states; and there are no effective sanctions for noncompliance with the obligations States parties have accepted.”
In regard to the courts, American Court has been more expansive and progressive than the European and African courts. This may find its basis in the wide powers assigned by the Convention to the American tribunal, which exceed those provided by the European and African conventions. The American Court is mandated i.a. to assure the injured party the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated.
Legal meaning and scope of the pronouncements of the different human rights bodies
Only in the regional level (European, American and African), there are human rights courts able to render judgments binding for the States parties involved in a cause, and -according to broad interpretations of these courts-, binding inclusively erga omnes.
There are human rights bodies at all levels capable of producing quasi-judicial pronouncements. The International Court of Justice has described these pronouncements as "jurisprudence", and regional and domestic courts have considered these documents, valid interpretation of general application as part of a treaty-living instrument.
However, many scholars and domestic tribunals understand that the statements of quasi-jurisdictional bodies are mandatory for the states involved in a case as there is a real process with all guarantees. Furthermore, the resolutions have the same formalities as the judgments. Nevertheless they have only indirect binding effects.
The principal arguments to support the jurisdictional role of the non judicial bodies are: the protection system “is endowed with a series of guarantees that ensure the principle of the supremacy of the Convention;” “some of the guarantees, such as the principles of good faith and pro homine, guide the proceedings;” “there are some specific guarantees related to the individual petition proceedings namely: conditions for the admissibility of petitions, and the principles of adversarial proceedings, procedural balance, and legal certainty;” “the proceedings before the quasi-jurisdictional bodies contain guarantees for adversarial proceedings similar to those that exist in litigation proceedings before the Courts;” “one of functions of the quasi-jurisdictional bodies itself is to monitor the adherence of its quasi-jurisdictional proceedings to these principles.”
In relation to what we have said in the preceding paragraphs, given the limitations of extension of this work, we'll only cite as examples some of the pronouncements that reflect such situations.
The Inter-American Court, in expansive perception, has expressed:
44. “Owing to the manifest incompatibility of self-amnesty laws and the American Convention on Human Rights, the said laws lack legal effect and may not continue to obstruct the investigation of the grounds on which this case is based or the identification and punishment of those responsible, nor can they have the same or a similar impact with regard to other cases that have occurred in Peru, where the rights established in the American Convention have been violated.” (Emphasis added)
14. “In its request for interpretation, the Commission asked the Court to determine the following: ‘Is the Judgment in the Barrios Altos Case, concerning the incompatibility of laws Nos.26479 and 26492 with the American Convention, general in scope or confined to that specific case only?’ The Commission’s contention is that ‘the effects of the Court’s judgment are not confined exclusively to the Barrios Altos Case, but rather to all those in which those amnesty laws were applied.’ It points out that paragraph 44 of the Court’s judgment of March 14, 2001 “can hardly be interpreted any other way.” (Emphasis added)
18.” The Court decides (…) 2. That given the nature of the violation that amnesty laws No. 26479 and No. 26492 constitute, the decision in the judgment on the merits in the Barrios Altos
Case has generic effects.” (Emphasis added)
115 “The corpus juris of international human rights law comprises a set of international instruments of varied content and juridical effects (treaties, conventions, resolutions and declarations). Its dynamic evolution has had a positive impact on international law in affirming and building up the latter’s faculty for regulating relations between States and the human beings within their respective jurisdictions. This Court, therefore, must adopt the proper approach to consider this question in the context of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law.” (Emphasis added)
101. “Accordingly, this Court considers that the principle of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws. Nowadays, no legal act that is in conflict with this fundamental principle is acceptable (…).” (Emphasis added)
34. “(…)(I)t is necessary to emphasize that the system of international protection must be understood as an integral whole (…). (T)he adoption of a restrictive interpretation as to the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction would not only be contrary to the purpose and end of the Convention, but it would also affect the effective application of the treaty and of the guarantee of protection that it provides, with negative consequences for the alleged victim in the exercise of his right to access to justice.” (Emphasis added)
99. Pursuant to the principle of effectiveness and the need of protection in those cases of people or groups in situation of vulnerability,(…) this Tribunal shall interpret and give essence to the rights enshrined in the Convention, according to the evolution of the international corpus juris existing in relation to the human rights of migrants, taking into account that the international community has recognized the need to adopt special measures to ensure the protection of the human rights of this group (…).” (Emphasis added)
225. “This Court has held in its case law that it is aware that domestic authorities are bound to respect the rule of law, and therefore, they are bound to apply the provisions in force within the legal system.(…) But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, all its bodies, including its judges, are also bound by such Convention, which forces them to see that all the effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws which are contrary to its purpose and end. (…) To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention. (…).” (Emphasis added)
In Separate opinion, judge Cançado Trindade, in the Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, said:
9. “In my view, the absence of an objective criterion of assessment of human suffering should not be invoked as a justification for a’technical’ - or rather mechanical - application of the relevant juridical norms. To the contrary, the lesson which appears to me necessary to extract from the present case of the "Street Children" (and also from the case Paniagua Morales and Others) is in the sense that one ought to be guided by the victimization and the human suffering, as well as the rehabilitation of the surviving victims(…), also in order to fill gaps in the applicable juridical norms and, furthermore, on the basis of considerations of equity, to reach a solution ex aequo et bono for the concrete case in conformity with Law. Ultimately, the jurisdiction (jus dicere, jurisdictio) of the Tribunal is summed up in its power to declare the Law, and the sentence (from the Latin sententia, etymologically derived from "sentimiento", feeling) is something more than a logical operation in the framework of predetermined juridical limits.” (Emphasis added)
Ashley Manson understands that the Court's expansion of the American Convention was supported by the Inter-American Court's previous case law and advisory opinions interpreting the American Convention, the European Court of Human Rights' case law, and global soft law of human rights. We can add that the expansion has also been supported on considerations of equity, judges’ feelings and transitional -ideological perception of justice.
The ECHR, for example, expands the applicable law. The Grand Chamber in the Case Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (Application no. 34503/97), judgment of 12 November 2008 concludes:
85. “The Court, in defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, can and must take into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common values. The consensus emerging from specialized international instruments and from the practice of Contracting States may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the Convention in specific cases.” (Emphasis added)
86. “In this context, it is not necessary for the respondent State to have ratified the entire collection of instruments that are applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case concerned. It will be sufficient for the Court that the relevant international instruments denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in international law or in the domestic law of the majority of member States of the Council of Europe and show, in a precise area, that there is common ground in modern societies (see, mutatis mutandis, Marckx, cited above, § 41).” (Emphasis added)
Some experts criticize such kind of constructivism, which creates new rights and obligations, in regard to substantive and procedural aspects.
Julian Arato considers, that unlike formal amendment (through the express decision of the member States according to a certain procedure), informal transformation occurs more subtly, through the practice of the specialized bodies. He thinks that the question is not whether the Court's interpretation does or does not expand a Convention right, but rather whether its approach to interpretation entails a novel assertion of authority over the States Parties. So, from the political perspective it represents a critical shift in the powers of the Court to hold the States Parties to legal instruments beyond their control and will. “By pushing the limits of the technique a court can dramatically expand its competence to consider legal materials beyond the treaties to which it has supposedly been confined .” The Courts asserts a competence over and above the States Parties in clear manifestation of judicial activism. The same author, in a different article, recalled Rietiker, who argues that "the mere label of 'human rights' instrument is, as such, not relevant to justify special treatment" with regard to interpreting a treaty as evolutive. Rietiker does not object the evolutive interpretation as such, but rather the reasoning that such an interpretation is warranted for the interpretation of human rights treaties per se.” -
John Tobin notes that monitoring bodies and advocates can be quick to offer interpretations that reflect personal and political preferences. He says that “such ‘result driven jurisprudence’ may well persuade those who focus on what the law should be (lex ferenda) but its impact is limited for those who focus on what they perceive the law to be (lex lata). Moreover, this lex ferenda approach encourages criticisms like David Kennedy's that the human rights movement degrades the legal profession by encouraging a-combination-of overly-formal reliance on textual articulations that are anything but clear or binding and sloppy humanitarian argument.’ Simply clothing an assertion about the content of an internationally recognized human right with the apparel of humanity may satisfy a moral or political urge, but it does not necessarily accord with the nature of the legal obligations actually assumed by a state under a human rights treaty.”
Although the International Court of Justice in the Case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo has explicitly referred to the Human Rights Committee in relation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the concept of ‘external system coherence’ seeks to accommodate and exceed the requirements under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, that the application of the general rule under Article 31(1) take into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. The requisite of external system coherence requires a consideration of the entire system of international law, especially the provisions of other human rights treaties (in this case, also its bodies), but also other multilateral treaties and regimes within international law.
At the time of their adoption, the conventions on human rights aimed to lay down minimum standards. This approach is generally based on the argument that the Court respects the sovereignty of the states and the necessity of the cooperation of the states parties. The human rights’ tribunals (following Conventions) have adopted the position that their role is subsidiary to that of the contracting states. The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ refers to the subsidiary role of the Convention machinery and entails first of all what may be termed a ‘procedural relationship’ between the national authorities responsible for implementing the Convention and deciding human rights issues on the one hand and the Convention institutions on the other. Nevertheless, the judge-as-mechanic principle and the idea of literal interpretation of law face obstacles pushed by the reality. In addressing the issues raised by parties in litigation, judges exercise choices because the parties argue that the same laws apply in different ways in regard to the underlying case. The task of the person who decides is not to satisfy logical precepts, but the objectives of law , which entail various theories of justice, based on philosophical doctrines and ideological positions. A purposive approach to judicial interpretation involves teasing out the meanings behind the words of the law, based on the intended purpose behind the law. George Letsas, the author of the definition of autonomous concepts ("technical terms that are employed in legal sources and are invested with special, non-ordinary meaning"), considers that in invocation of “non-ordinary meaning”, judges assign freely the scope and significance of the law, “making” new law. Deeper opening occurs in cases of evolutionary, progressive or innovative interpretation. It is observable that the specialized bodies often produce interpretations contrary to the drafters’ intentions, giving precedence to the Convention’s purpose or to the feeling of the judges over the international instrument. Giuseppe Martinico, in relation to the European system of human rights protection interrogates himself if the European Convention is going to be “supreme.”
Some final considerations
In a great number of cases, jurisprudence and quasi-jurisprudence of tribunals and other specialized bodies has changed the real substance of the human rights conventions and has entered itself with supreme character in the legal bloodstream of the states. At this time, the International Court of Justice has allowed to human rights case-law enter in the international law as "body" of great weight, incorporating and legitimizing thereby not only the achievements but also the excesses of those agencies.
However, in subsequent cases, as Georgia v. Russian Federation (judgment of 1 April 2011), the I.C.J. has not kept that humanized position. The Court declared itself not competent based on a formalistic interpretation of the Art. 22 of the CERD, and ignored the value (declared “great weight”) of the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. - It also ignored the pro homine principle sustained in all specialized bodies of human rights. Perhaps the fact that Russia was the defendant may have influenced the decision of the Court given the inconvenience of taking a position in relation to a sensitive political situation.
Despite the above noted, one wonders if the “great weight”, that the Court gives to the "jurisprudence" of specialized human rights bodies does not imply a new parameter for to the interpretation of treaties and general international law, and constitutes the basis of a human rights new constitutional and moral superiority in the international legal system.
This means that decisions and recommendations of the judicial and quasi-judicial bodies specializing in human rights –and their evolutionary standards- can enter in the bloodstream of the international law, and create a new Law ad gentes, sacred right to expand and impose.
Traducción - inglés
SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LEGAL ROLE OF THE SENTENCES AND RECOMENDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES CREATED FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Zlata Drnas de Clément*
ABSTRACT: This article aims to reflect about the role of pronouncements of the various specialized bodies for the protection of human rights and legal meaning and scope of the "weight” assigned by the International Court of Justice in the Case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) -sentence of 30 November 2010- to the interpretations adopted by the independents bodies that was established specifically to supervise the application of human rights treaty.
KEY WORDS: Human rights specialized bodies – Role of the pronouncements – Universalization.
The International Court of Justice in the Case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) -sentence of 30 November 2010- referred to the "jurisprudence" (“case law”) of the Human Rights Committee and ruled that “(a)lthough the Court is in no way obliged, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation of the Covenant [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] on that of the Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent body that was established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty.”
This leads us to reflect about the role of pronouncements of the various specialized bodies for the protection of human rights and legal meaning and scope of the "weight” assigned by the Court to the interpretations of human right’s instruments by expert entities.
Some international bodies created for the protection of human rights
Universal Level
The United Nations Human Rights Council (subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly established in 2006, successor of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights) is an inter-governmental body of 47 States responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and make recommendations on them (specific country situations or thematic issues). The format of the outcome of the review will be a report consisting of a summary of the proceedings of the review process; conclusions and/or recommendations, and the voluntary commitments of the State concerned. Special procedures may be individual ("Special Rapporteur" or "Independent Expert") or a working group usually composed of five members (one from each region). In 2007, the Human Rights Council decided to create an Advisory Committee of eighteen members to provide expert advice and adopted a new Complaint Procedure, established to address consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of all human rights and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any part of the world.
The Human Rights Committee -the principal quasi-judicial human rights body within the U.N. human rights system- has 18 independent experts who are persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights that monitors implementation by its State parties of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, in force from 23 March 1976). States must report initially one year after acceding to the Covenant and then whenever the Committee requests (usually every four years). The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations, generally divided into the following sections: Introduction, Positive factors, and Principal subjects of concern and recommendations. In addition to the reporting procedure, article 41 of the Covenant provides for the Committee to consider inter-state complaints, and under First Optional protocol, individual complaints. The Committee also publishes its interpretation of the content of human rights provisions, known as general comments.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is the body of 18 independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by its States parties. All States parties submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially within two years of accepting the Covenant and thereafter every five years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. With regard to individual complaints, in 2008, the General Assembly adopted an Optional Protocol (GA resolution A/RES/63/117) to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which provides the Committee competence to receive and consider communications. The Committee transmits its findings to the State Party concerned together with comments and recommendations. The Committee publishes its interpretation of the provisions of the Covenant, known as general comments.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) is the oldest body created for the protection of human rights. It has 18 independent experts that monitor implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by its State parties. States parties are obliged submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially one year after acceding to the Convention and then every two years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. The Convention establishes three other mechanisms through which the Committee performs its monitoring functions: the early-warning procedure, the examination of inter-state complaints and the examination of individual complaints. The Committee includes in its annual report a summary of the communications and, where appropriate, a summary of the explanations and statements of the States Parties concerned and of its own suggestions and recommendations. The Committee also publishes its interpretation of the content of human rights provisions (general recommendations or general comments).
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is the body of 23 independent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. States parties are obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights of the Convention are implemented. During its sessions the Committee considers each State party report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. In accordance with the Optional Protocol to the Convention, the CEDAW receive communications from individuals or groups of individuals. These procedures are optional and are only available where the State concerned has accepted them. The Committee also formulates general recommendations and suggestions.
The Committee Against Torture (CAT) is the body of 10 independent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by its State parties. States parties submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially one year after acceding to the Convention and then every four years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. The Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“SPT”), composed of 25 independent and impartial experts, started in 2007 pursuant the Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture. Is a new kind of treaty body with purely preventive mandate (visits, assessment, advices). It produces recommendations and observations to Sates.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the body of 18 independent experts that monitors implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by its State parties. It also monitors implementation of two optional protocols to the Convention, on involvement of children in armed conflict and on sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. On 19 December 2011, the UN General Assembly approved a third optional protocol on a Communications Procedure, which will allow individual children to submit complaints regarding specific violations of their rights under the Convention and its first two optional protocols. The Protocol opens for signature in 2012 and will enter into force upon ratification by 10 UN Member States. States parties submit regular reports to the Committee initially two years after acceding to the Convention and then every five years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations.
The Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW) is the body of 14 independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families by its State parties. States parties submit regular reports to the Committee initially one year after acceding to the Convention and then every five years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of concluding observations. The Committee also, under certain circumstances, is able to consider individual complaints or communications from individuals claiming that their rights under the Convention have been violated once 10 States parties have accepted this procedure in accordance with article 77 of the Convention. At the moment, two States have accepted this procedure.
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is the body of 12 (later 18) independent experts which monitors implementation of the Convention by the States Parties. States parties submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially within two years of accepting the Convention and thereafter every four years. The Committee examines each report and shall make suggestions and general recommendations on the report. The Optional Protocol to the Convention gives the Committee competence to examine individual complaints with regard to alleged violations of the Convention by States parties to the Protocol. After examining a communication, the Committee shall forward its suggestions and recommendations, if any, to the State Party concerned and to the petitioner.
The Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) is the body of 10 independent experts which monitors implementation of the Convention by the States Parties. States must report initially within two years of accepting the Convention. The Committee examines each report and shall make such suggestions and general recommendations on the report. A State Party may at the time of ratification of the Convention or at any time afterwards declare that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by this State Party of provisions of this Convention. The Committee produces comments, observations or recommendations.
Regional level
Europe
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a court established in 1959 by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and hears complaints that a contracting state has violated the human rights enshrined in the Convention and its 14 protocols.
It consists of a number of judges equal to the number of member States of the Council of Europe. The Court’s judges sit in their individual capacity and do not represent any State. In dealing with applications, the Court is assisted by a Registry consisting mainly of lawyers from all the member States (who are also known as legal secretaries). They are entirely independent of their country of origin and do not represent either applicants or States.
The Court receives complaints by individuals or other contracting states. The Convention was adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe and all of its 47 member states are parties to the Convention. In final judgments the Court declares that a contracting state has violated (or not) the Convention, and may order to the State to pay material and/or moral damages and the legal costs of the case. The Convention states that Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. Advisory opinions are not binding, regardless of legal weight in the system they have.
America
The legal regime to which the organs of the inter-American system of protection of human rights must adhere is based on the declaration of the fundamental human rights in the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and -as a result of progressive efforts during the twentieth century-, a sui generis system has been completed by: the American Convention on Human Rights; the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty; the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons; the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities. However, the Charter and the Convention are the only instruments that establish rules of due process for the proceedings of the system’s organs (Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court). The other instruments refer to the Convention with regard to everything that concerns proceedings. The OAS Charter establishes the powers and competence of the Commission. So, in the case of the OAS Member States not parties to the Convention, the due process regime refers the administration of requests and communications to Articles I, II, III, IV, XVIII, XXV and XXVI of the American Declaration, based on the provisions of Article 24 of the Statute of the Commission which, in turn, refers to its Rules of Procedure. In the case of the parties to the Convention, the competent organs are the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Both the Commission and the Court -in different ways- are empowered to interpret the Convention. The Commission is an organ of the OAS; but, it is also an organ of the American Convention, and its powers are established in Article 41 of this instrument. As an organ of the Convention, the Commission is linked to the Court, because both have the authority to examine individual and State communications in accordance with Articles 44, 45, 51, 61 and ff. of the Convention, though in different ways. Only in the mentioned area, the Court has the power to review whether the Commission has complied with the provisions of the American Convention and the different inter-American human rights instruments. The Inter-American Court controls due process of law in the proceedings before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in relation to the processing of matters that have been submitted to the Court’s consideration, in accordance with the competence granted to it by the American Convention and other inter-American instruments for the protection of human rights. In the other areas the Commission and the Court have autonomy and functional independence.
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) is a principal and autonomous organ of the OAS, created in 1959, composed of seven independent members. Together with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Commission is one of the institutions of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR, Pacto of “San José-Costa Rica”).
The Commission exercises three types of function with the basic purpose of the promotion, observance and protection of human rights: (i) administrative; (ii) advisory and promotional, and (iii) quasi-jurisdictional, as set forth in Articles 44 to 51 of the Convention.
The Commission makes requests or recommendations to the governments of the member states, prepares studies or reports, and issues conclusions.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (seven judges, nationals of the member states of the OAS) is the judicial organ of the American Convention on Human Rights, established in San José-Costa Rica, in 1979.
The Court enforces and interprets the provisions of the ACHR through its adjudicatory and advisory functions. Only the States Parties and the Commission have the right to submit a contentious case to the Court.
The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of the ACHR that are submitted to it, provided that the States parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration, or by a special agreement.
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by the ACHR, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of the right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.
The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. The judgment of the Court is final and not subject to appeal (admits only interpretation at request). The advisory function of the IACtHR enables it to respond to consultations submitted by agencies and member states of the OAS (advisory opinion on domestic laws and proposed legislation, and whether or not they are compatible with the Convention's provisions).
Africa
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The African Charter established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (eleven members) to promote, protect, interpret the rights enshrined under the Charter, and to ensure that member states comply with their obligations undertaken under the Charter. The Commission was inaugurated on 2 November 1987. Later the Commission was charged also with the functions of protection and promotion of human and peoples' rights and the interpretation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Commission produces reports and recommendations.
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The Court (eleven judges) was established by virtue of Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted by Member States of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June 1998. It has jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.
The Court complements the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights conferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
The Court’s jurisdiction applies only to states that have ratified the Court’s Protocol.
The Court may receive complaints and/or applications submitted to it either by the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights or State parties to the Protocol or African Intergovernmental Organizations. Non-Governmental Organizations with observer status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and individuals from States which have made a Declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court can also institute cases directly before the Court. The judgment of the Court shall be final and not subject to appeal At the request of a Member State of the OAU, the OAU, any of its organs, or any African organization recognized by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the Commission.
The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights is seized with matters of interpretation arising from the application or implementation of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) adopted en 1990, established the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (eleven members), i.a. to promote and protect the rights enshrined in the ACRWC; to monitor the implementation and ensure protection of the rights enshrined in the Charter; to interpret the provisions of the Charter at the request of a State Party, an Institution of the Organization of African Unity or any other person or Institution recognized by the Organization of African Unity, or any State Party. The Committee monitors the implementation of the Charter and may receive communication, from any person, group or non-governmental organization recognized by the OAU, by a Member State, or the United Nations relating to any matter covered by the Charter. As final outcome, produces reports.
Some partial reflections
As we can see, courts except, the different bodies has merely recommendatory or informative role and are not able to produce genuine jurisprudence.
Some domestic tribunals have recognized the binding value of the pronouncements of quasi - judicial bodies and have called “jurisprudence” their resolutions.
José Ovalle Favela remembers that Norberto Bobbio stated that the activities of international organizations for the protection of human rights can be considered under three aspects: the promotion (set of actions that aim to induce states to introduce or improve internal regulation), the control (set of international measures put in place to check whether the recommendations have been accepted and to what extent), and the ensuring (real organization of jurisdictional international protection). Some quasi-judicial bodies interpret the law with guarantees similar to those of the courts.
As Thomas Buergenthal noted, the system has its built-in limitations: the initial step rests with the states, which must first ratify or accede to a legally binding instrument; the system continually requires at least some level of voluntary cooperation by states; and there are no effective sanctions for noncompliance with the obligations States parties have accepted.”
In regard to the courts, American Court has been more expansive and progressive than the European and African courts. This may find its basis in the wide powers assigned by the Convention to the American tribunal, which exceed those provided by the European and African conventions. The American Court is mandated i.a. to assure the injured party the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated.
Legal meaning and scope of the pronouncements of the different human rights bodies
Only in the regional level (European, American and African), there are human rights courts able to render judgments binding for the States parties involved in a cause, and -according to broad interpretations of these courts-, binding inclusively erga omnes.
There are human rights bodies at all levels capable of producing quasi-judicial pronouncements. The International Court of Justice has described these pronouncements as "jurisprudence", and regional and domestic courts have considered these documents, valid interpretation of general application as part of a treaty-living instrument.
However, many scholars and domestic tribunals understand that the statements of quasi-jurisdictional bodies are mandatory for the states involved in a case as there is a real process with all guarantees. Furthermore, the resolutions have the same formalities as the judgments. Nevertheless they have only indirect binding effects.
The principal arguments to support the jurisdictional role of the non judicial bodies are: the protection system “is endowed with a series of guarantees that ensure the principle of the supremacy of the Convention;” “some of the guarantees, such as the principles of good faith and pro homine, guide the proceedings;” “there are some specific guarantees related to the individual petition proceedings namely: conditions for the admissibility of petitions, and the principles of adversarial proceedings, procedural balance, and legal certainty;” “the proceedings before the quasi-jurisdictional bodies contain guarantees for adversarial proceedings similar to those that exist in litigation proceedings before the Courts;” “one of functions of the quasi-jurisdictional bodies itself is to monitor the adherence of its quasi-jurisdictional proceedings to these principles.”
In relation to what we have said in the preceding paragraphs, given the limitations of extension of this work, we'll only cite as examples some of the pronouncements that reflect such situations.
The Inter-American Court, in expansive perception, has expressed:
44. “Owing to the manifest incompatibility of self-amnesty laws and the American Convention on Human Rights, the said laws lack legal effect and may not continue to obstruct the investigation of the grounds on which this case is based or the identification and punishment of those responsible, nor can they have the same or a similar impact with regard to other cases that have occurred in Peru, where the rights established in the American Convention have been violated.” (Emphasis added)
14. “In its request for interpretation, the Commission asked the Court to determine the following: ‘Is the Judgment in the Barrios Altos Case, concerning the incompatibility of laws Nos.26479 and 26492 with the American Convention, general in scope or confined to that specific case only?’ The Commission’s contention is that ‘the effects of the Court’s judgment are not confined exclusively to the Barrios Altos Case, but rather to all those in which those amnesty laws were applied.’ It points out that paragraph 44 of the Court’s judgment of March 14, 2001 “can hardly be interpreted any other way.” (Emphasis added)
18.” The Court decides (…) 2. That given the nature of the violation that amnesty laws No. 26479 and No. 26492 constitute, the decision in the judgment on the merits in the Barrios Altos
Case has generic effects.” (Emphasis added)
115 “The corpus juris of international human rights law comprises a set of international instruments of varied content and juridical effects (treaties, conventions, resolutions and declarations). Its dynamic evolution has had a positive impact on international law in affirming and building up the latter’s faculty for regulating relations between States and the human beings within their respective jurisdictions. This Court, therefore, must adopt the proper approach to consider this question in the context of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law.” (Emphasis added)
101. “Accordingly, this Court considers that the principle of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws. Nowadays, no legal act that is in conflict with this fundamental principle is acceptable (…).” (Emphasis added)
34. “(…)(I)t is necessary to emphasize that the system of international protection must be understood as an integral whole (…). (T)he adoption of a restrictive interpretation as to the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction would not only be contrary to the purpose and end of the Convention, but it would also affect the effective application of the treaty and of the guarantee of protection that it provides, with negative consequences for the alleged victim in the exercise of his right to access to justice.” (Emphasis added)
99. Pursuant to the principle of effectiveness and the need of protection in those cases of people or groups in situation of vulnerability,(…) this Tribunal shall interpret and give essence to the rights enshrined in the Convention, according to the evolution of the international corpus juris existing in relation to the human rights of migrants, taking into account that the international community has recognized the need to adopt special measures to ensure the protection of the human rights of this group (…).” (Emphasis added)
225. “This Court has held in its case law that it is aware that domestic authorities are bound to respect the rule of law, and therefore, they are bound to apply the provisions in force within the legal system.(…) But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, all its bodies, including its judges, are also bound by such Convention, which forces them to see that all the effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws which are contrary to its purpose and end. (…) To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention. (…).” (Emphasis added)
In Separate opinion, judge Cançado Trindade, in the Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, said:
9. “In my view, the absence of an objective criterion of assessment of human suffering should not be invoked as a justification for a’technical’ - or rather mechanical - application of the relevant juridical norms. To the contrary, the lesson which appears to me necessary to extract from the present case of the "Street Children" (and also from the case Paniagua Morales and Others) is in the sense that one ought to be guided by the victimization and the human suffering, as well as the rehabilitation of the surviving victims(…), also in order to fill gaps in the applicable juridical norms and, furthermore, on the basis of considerations of equity, to reach a solution ex aequo et bono for the concrete case in conformity with Law. Ultimately, the jurisdiction (jus dicere, jurisdictio) of the Tribunal is summed up in its power to declare the Law, and the sentence (from the Latin sententia, etymologically derived from "sentimiento", feeling) is something more than a logical operation in the framework of predetermined juridical limits.” (Emphasis added)
Ashley Manson understands that the Court's expansion of the American Convention was supported by the Inter-American Court's previous case law and advisory opinions interpreting the American Convention, the European Court of Human Rights' case law, and global soft law of human rights. We can add that the expansion has also been supported on considerations of equity, judges’ feelings and transitional -ideological perception of justice.
The ECHR, for example, expands the applicable law. The Grand Chamber in the Case Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (Application no. 34503/97), judgment of 12 November 2008 concludes:
85. “The Court, in defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, can and must take into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common values. The consensus emerging from specialized international instruments and from the practice of Contracting States may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the Convention in specific cases.” (Emphasis added)
86. “In this context, it is not necessary for the respondent State to have ratified the entire collection of instruments that are applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case concerned. It will be sufficient for the Court that the relevant international instruments denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in international law or in the domestic law of the majority of member States of the Council of Europe and show, in a precise area, that there is common ground in modern societies (see, mutatis mutandis, Marckx, cited above, § 41).” (Emphasis added)
Some experts criticize such kind of constructivism, which creates new rights and obligations, in regard to substantive and procedural aspects.
Julian Arato considers, that unlike formal amendment (through the express decision of the member States according to a certain procedure), informal transformation occurs more subtly, through the practice of the specialized bodies. He thinks that the question is not whether the Court's interpretation does or does not expand a Convention right, but rather whether its approach to interpretation entails a novel assertion of authority over the States Parties. So, from the political perspective it represents a critical shift in the powers of the Court to hold the States Parties to legal instruments beyond their control and will. “By pushing the limits of the technique a court can dramatically expand its competence to consider legal materials beyond the treaties to which it has supposedly been confined .” The Courts asserts a competence over and above the States Parties in clear manifestation of judicial activism. The same author, in a different article, recalled Rietiker, who argues that "the mere label of 'human rights' instrument is, as such, not relevant to justify special treatment" with regard to interpreting a treaty as evolutive. Rietiker does not object the evolutive interpretation as such, but rather the reasoning that such an interpretation is warranted for the interpretation of human rights treaties per se.” -
John Tobin notes that monitoring bodies and advocates can be quick to offer interpretations that reflect personal and political preferences. He says that “such ‘result driven jurisprudence’ may well persuade those who focus on what the law should be (lex ferenda) but its impact is limited for those who focus on what they perceive the law to be (lex lata). Moreover, this lex ferenda approach encourages criticisms like David Kennedy's that the human rights movement degrades the legal profession by encouraging a-combination-of overly-formal reliance on textual articulations that are anything but clear or binding and sloppy humanitarian argument.’ Simply clothing an assertion about the content of an internationally recognized human right with the apparel of humanity may satisfy a moral or political urge, but it does not necessarily accord with the nature of the legal obligations actually assumed by a state under a human rights treaty.”
Although the International Court of Justice in the Case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo has explicitly referred to the Human Rights Committee in relation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the concept of ‘external system coherence’ seeks to accommodate and exceed the requirements under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, that the application of the general rule under Article 31(1) take into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. The requisite of external system coherence requires a consideration of the entire system of international law, especially the provisions of other human rights treaties (in this case, also its bodies), but also other multilateral treaties and regimes within international law.
At the time of their adoption, the conventions on human rights aimed to lay down minimum standards. This approach is generally based on the argument that the Court respects the sovereignty of the states and the necessity of the cooperation of the states parties. The human rights’ tribunals (following Conventions) have adopted the position that their role is subsidiary to that of the contracting states. The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ refers to the subsidiary role of the Convention machinery and entails first of all what may be termed a ‘procedural relationship’ between the national authorities responsible for implementing the Convention and deciding human rights issues on the one hand and the Convention institutions on the other. Nevertheless, the judge-as-mechanic principle and the idea of literal interpretation of law face obstacles pushed by the reality. In addressing the issues raised by parties in litigation, judges exercise choices because the parties argue that the same laws apply in different ways in regard to the underlying case. The task of the person who decides is not to satisfy logical precepts, but the objectives of law , which entail various theories of justice, based on philosophical doctrines and ideological positions. A purposive approach to judicial interpretation involves teasing out the meanings behind the words of the law, based on the intended purpose behind the law. George Letsas, the author of the definition of autonomous concepts ("technical terms that are employed in legal sources and are invested with special, non-ordinary meaning"), considers that in invocation of “non-ordinary meaning”, judges assign freely the scope and significance of the law, “making” new law. Deeper opening occurs in cases of evolutionary, progressive or innovative interpretation. It is observable that the specialized bodies often produce interpretations contrary to the drafters’ intentions, giving precedence to the Convention’s purpose or to the feeling of the judges over the international instrument. Giuseppe Martinico, in relation to the European system of human rights protection interrogates himself if the European Convention is going to be “supreme.”
Some final considerations
In a great number of cases, jurisprudence and quasi-jurisprudence of tribunals and other specialized bodies has changed the real substance of the human rights conventions and has entered itself with supreme character in the legal bloodstream of the states. At this time, the International Court of Justice has allowed to human rights case-law enter in the international law as "body" of great weight, incorporating and legitimizing thereby not only the achievements but also the excesses of those agencies.
However, in subsequent cases, as Georgia v. Russian Federation (judgment of 1 April 2011), the I.C.J. has not kept that humanized position. The Court declared itself not competent based on a formalistic interpretation of the Art. 22 of the CERD, and ignored the value (declared “great weight”) of the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. - It also ignored the pro homine principle sustained in all specialized bodies of human rights. Perhaps the fact that Russia was the defendant may have influenced the decision of the Court given the inconvenience of taking a position in relation to a sensitive political situation.
Despite the above noted, one wonders if the “great weight”, that the Court gives to the "jurisprudence" of specialized human rights bodies does not imply a new parameter for to the interpretation of treaties and general international law, and constitutes the basis of a human rights new constitutional and moral superiority in the international legal system.
This means that decisions and recommendations of the judicial and quasi-judicial bodies specializing in human rights –and their evolutionary standards- can enter in the bloodstream of the international law, and create a new Law ad gentes, sacred right to expand and impose.
inglés al español: LA SUSPENSION DE UN ESTADO MIEMBRO EN UNA ORGANIZACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE INTEGRACION. EL MERCOSUR
Texto de origen - inglés LA SUSPENSION DE UN ESTADO MIEMBRO EN UNA ORGANIZACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE INTEGRACION. EL MERCOSUR
Ernesto J. Rey Caro*
La suspensión de un Estado miembro de una Organización Internacional de Integración no es un hecho habitual. Más aún, existen pocos antecedentes y cada uno de ellos tiene sus particularidades. De allí que acontecimientos de esta naturaleza acaparan la atención de los estudiosos y merecen particulares consideraciones. Centraremos la atención en el caso de la suspensión de Paraguay como Miembro Pleno del Mercosur.
El 21 de julio de 2012, el Tribunal Permanente de Revisión del Mercosur se pronunció en el procedimiento de urgencia solicitado por la República del Paraguay en relación a la suspensión de su participación en los órganos del Mercado Común de Sur y la incorporación de Venezuela como Miembro Pleno(1).
La situación que dio originen al petitorio de Paraguay, se originó en la destitución por el Senado de la República de Paraguay, previa participación de la Cámara de Diputados, del Presidente Fernando Lugo, y la asunción del Vicepresidente Federico Franco en su reemplazo, hecho producido el día 22 de junio del mismo año.
En efecto, los Presidentes de los países Miembros del Mercosur en la reunión celebrada en la ciudad de Mendoza a fines de junio de 2012, adoptaron el día 29 de dicho mes una Decisión que rezaba: “1. Suspender a la República del Paraguay del derecho a participar en los órganos del Mercosur y de las deliberaciones, en los términos del artículo 5º del Protocolo de Ushuaia”(2). En los fundamentos se señala que de conformidad con este Protocolo sobre Compromiso Democrático, la plena vigencia de las instituciones democráticas se considera esencial para el desarrollo del proceso de integración, constituyendo tal ruptura “un obstáculo inaceptable para la continuidad del proceso de integración”. Asimismo se destaca que conforme a los tratados fundacionales del Mercosur, la suspensión aparejaba la limitación en la participación de Paraguay en la participación de los órganos, “así como la pérdida de los derechos de veto y de voto”. Se menciona la “Declaración de los Estados Partes del Mercosur y Estados Asociados sobre ruptura del orden democrático en Paraguay”, emitida el 24 de junio del mismo año( 3).
La Decisión en consideración también establece que: “2. Mientras dure la suspensión, lo previsto en el inciso iii) del artículo 40 del Protocolo de Ouro Preto se producirá con la incorporación que realicen Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay, en los términos del inciso ii) de dicho artículo”, y que la suspensión cesará – apartado 3- cuando de acuerdo a lo establecido en el artículo 7º del Protocolo de Ushuaia, se verifique el pleno establecimiento del orden democrático en la parte afectada, manteniendo los Cancilleres “consultas regulares al respecto”. Se resuelve asimismo comunicar al Parlamento del Mercosur la decisión adoptada.
Cabe señalar que la Declaración del 24 de junio, suscripta por la República Argentina, la República Federativa de Brasil, la República de Uruguay, la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, la República de Chile, la República de Colombia, la República de Ecuador y la República de Perú, destacaba que de acuerdo al Protocolo de Ushuaia de 1998, la plena vigencia de las instituciones democráticas, era condición esencial para el desarrollo del proceso de integración y, en la parte decisoria se expresaba en primer lugar, la “más enérgica condena a la ruptura del orden democrático en la República del Paraguay por no haberse adoptado el debido proceso” y “suspender al Paraguay en forma inmediata y por este acto, del derecho de participar de la XLIII Reunión del Consejo del Marcado Común y Cumbre de Presidentes del Mercosur, así como de las reuniones preparatorias que tendrán lugar en la Ciudad de Mendoza, entre el 25 y 29 de junio de 2012”. En su apartado tercero se estableció que en la Reunión Cumbre del Mercosur de Jefes y Jefas de Estado se adoptarían ulteriores medidas.
Conjuntamente con la Decisión mencionada, del 29 de junio, los Presidentes de de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay suscribieron una “Declaración” que dispuso en el primer apartado “El ingreso de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela al Mercosur” ,y se convoca a una reunión especial para el día 31 de junio de 2012 para la “admisión oficial de este país al Mercosur. En un tercer apartado se convoca a todos los países de América del Sur “para que en el complejo escenario internacional actual se unan, para lograr que el proceso de crecimiento e inclusión social protagonizado en la última década en nuestra región, se profundice y actúe como factor de estabilidad económica y social en un ambiente de plena vigencia de la democracia en el continente”.
Se advierte entonces que los acontecimientos producidos en Paraguay determinaron dos decisiones en el seno del Mercosur. Por una parte la suspensión aplicada al Paraguay en los términos ya mencionados y, por la otra, la incorporación de Venezuela como Miembro Pleno. Ello sin perjuicio de que ya con fecha 24 de junio se aplicara una primera suspensión en virtud de la cual se negó a este país la participación en la Cumbre de Mendoza.
De la relación fáctica realizada, surge que el instrumento axial sobre el que se apoyaba la determinación de suspender a Paraguay, fue el Protocolo Ushuaia sobre Compromiso Democrático en el Mercosur, de julio de 1998, suscripto por los cuatro Estados Miembro, la República de Bolivia y la República de Chile.
Este instrumento, establece –artículo 2-, que “se aplicará a las relaciones que resulten de los respectivos Acuerdos de integración vigentes entre los Estados Partes del presente Protocolo, en caso de ruptura del orden democrático en alguno de ellos” y que de producirse tal hecho –artículo 3-, ello “dará lugar a la aplicación de los procedimientos previstos en los artículo siguientes”. Estos procedimientos y la forma de adopción de las medidas pertinentes han sido regulados en los artículos 4, 5 y 6.
En primer lugar –artículo 4-, en el caso de “ruptura” del orden democrático en un Estado Parte “los demás Estados Partes promoverán las consultas pertinentes entre sí y con el Estado afectado”. Cuando las consultas mencionadas - artículo 5- resultaren infructuosas, los demás Estados Partes del Protocolo, según corresponda de conformidad con los Acuerdos de integración vigentes entre ellos “considerarán la naturaleza y el alcance de las medidas a aplicar teniendo en cuenta la gravedad de la situación existente”. Tales medidas, de conformidad con este mismo dispositivo “abarcarán desde la suspensión del derecho a participar en los órganos de los respectivos procesos de integración, hasta la suspensión de los derechos y obligaciones emergentes de esos procesos”. Las medidas previstas en el artículo 5 se adoptan por “consenso” y se comunican al Estado “afectado”, el cual no participará en el proceso decisorio pertinente. Las medidas entran en vigor en la fecha en que se realiza la comunicación. Las medidas cesan – artículo 7- a partir de la fecha en que se comunique al Estado sancionado el acuerdo de los Estados que adoptaron tales medidas “de que se ha verificado el pleno restablecimiento del orden democrático”, y tiene lugar “tan pronto ese restablecimiento se haga efectivo”.
Del examen de la situación y del instrumento invocado para la suspensión, emanan algunas circunstancias que merecen ser destacadas.
En primer lugar, en las decisiones adoptadas el 24 de junio y el 29 de junio, no se efectúa relación alguna de los hechos concretos en que se fundamentan. Solo se menciona genéricamente “la ruptura del orden democrático” y “no haberse respetado el debido proceso”. Podría deducirse que la ruptura del orden democrático se habría producido por no haberse respetado el debido proceso en la destitución de Lugo, pero no hay referencia alguna. Medidas de tal envergadura, que implican la suspensión del Estado Parte de conformidad con el Protocolo de Ushuaia, en nuestra opinión, deberían haberse fundado adecuadamente y con mención expresa de los hechos, sin perjuicio de la valoración que de éstos pudiera realizar cada Estado Parte que participa en la toma de la decisión pertinente.
Pero lo más preocupante, es que no se ha seguido el procedimiento establecido en el Protocolo, que como lo hemos señalado prescribe consultas con “el Estado afectado”. Paradójicamente la resolución que suspende a Paraguay “por no haberse respetado el debido proceso”, se adopta en violación del “debido procedimiento” prescripto en el instrumento convencional aplicado.
Otro de las consecuencias derivadas de la suspensión aplicada a Paraguay, es la incorporación de Venezuela. En efecto, los términos del Tratado de Asunción son claros al respecto, en cuanto dispone para el caso de adhesión al Tratado – Articulo 20, in fine- que la aprobación de la solicitud será objeto de “decisión unánime de los Estados Partes”. La vigencia de este dispositivo se reitera expresamente en el Acuerdo Marco para la Adhesión de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela al Mercosur del 8 de diciembre de 2005.
Es conocida la circunstancia de que Paraguay no había prestado aún el consentimiento requerido por el Tratado de Asunción. La suspensión impuesta no le ha quitado el carácter de Estado Parte y Miembro del Mercosur. De allí que la Resolución adoptada el 29 de junio por los otros tres Estados del Mercosur de efectivizar el ingreso de Venezuela, importa una clara violación del Tratado de 1991.
Cabe señalar que el Protocolo de Montevideo, suscripto en diciembre de 2011, conocido también como Ushuaia II, y que aún no se encuentra en vigor, al margen de tener un ámbito de aplicación más amplio, luce como un instrumento más completo. Este Protocolo se aplicará – Artículo 1-, en caso “de ruptura o amenaza de ruptura del orden democrático, de una violación del orden constitucional o de cualquier situación que ponga en riesgo el legítimo ejercicio del poder y la vigencia de los valores y principios democráticos”. Enumera las autoridades u órganos competentes para intervenir, y el lugar de la reunión de éstos – Artículo 2-; el procedimiento a seguir – Artículos 3,4 y 5- y, lo que es útil destacar, se establece en el dispositivo siguiente un catálogo de medidas que pueden ser adoptadas. Ellas son: suspender el derecho a participar en los distintos órganos de la estructura institucional del Mercosur; cerrar en forma total o parcial las fronteras terrestres; suspender o limitar el comercio, tráfico aéreo y marítimo, las comunicaciones y la provisión de energía, servicios y suministros; suspender a la Parte afectada del goce de los derechos y beneficios emergentes del Tratado de Asunción y sus Protocolos y de los acuerdos de integración celebrados entre Partes; promover la suspensión de la Parte afectada en el ámbito de otras organizaciones regionales e internacionales; promover ante terceros países o grupos de países la suspensión a la Parte afectada de derechos y/o beneficios derivados de los acuerdos de cooperación de los que fuera parte; respaldar los esfuerzos regionales e internacionales, en particular en el marco de las Naciones Unidas, encaminados a resolver y a encontrar una solución pacífica y democrática a la situación acaecida en la Parte afectada; y adoptar sanciones políticas y diplomáticas adicionales. Prescribe que tales medidas “guardarán la debida proporcionalidad con la gravedad de la situación existente, no deberán poner en riesgo el bienestar de la población y el goce efectivo de los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales en la Parte afectada; respetar la soberanía e integridad territorial de la Parte afectada, la situación de los países sin litoral marítimo y los tratados vigentes”. En otras normas se prevé la forma de aplicar las decisiones adoptadas, la vigencia de ellas, la cesación de su aplicación, etc. No es el objetivo de estas reflexiones analizar este instrumento, que merece de por sí un detenido estudio que tendría que abarcar sus virtudes y también las numerosas dudas que se originan de su detenida lectura. Solo ha sido traído a colación para resaltar los silencios y ausencia de previsiones que se observan en el Protocolo de Ushuaia.
Otra cuestión que abre muchos interrogantes, que se originan en las disposiciones de la Decisión de los Jefes de Estado de 29 de junio, es la previsión del apartado 2 referida a los incisos ii y iii del Artículo 40 del Protocolo de Ouro Preto, a aplicarse durante el periodo que dure la suspensión incoada a Paraguay. En efecto, de conformidad con tal previsión podrán incorporarse normas sin la participación de Paraguay. Si se trata de normas que ya han sido aprobadas con la participación de este país - que no ha perdido la calidad de Estado Parte en el Tratado de Asunción, el Protocolo de Ouro Preto y todos los demás Acuerdos-, pero que aún no han sido incorporadas, aquella determinación resulta claramente violatoria del referido Artículo 40 en cuanto dispone que “cuando todos los Estados hubieren informado la incorporación a sus respectivos ordenamientos jurídicos internos, la Secretaría del Mercosur comunicará el hecho a cada Estado Parte”. Este ha sido el propósito de los Estados que aplicaron la sanción? Por otro lado, surge el interrogante en relación a si esa norma incorporada solo con la participación de los tres Estados que aplicaron la sanción podría tener efectos en relación a Paraguay. Igualmente, si aquella determinación incluida en la Decisión estuviera referida a normas que se pudieran aprobar durante la vigencia de la suspensión, es decir aprobadas sin la participación de Paraguay por estar suspendida su participación en los órganos del Mercosur, nos encontraríamos ante un “derecho” aplicable solamente a una parte de los Estados Miembro del Mercosur. Asimismo, nos preguntamos qué obligatoriedad tendrían para Paraguay una vez que hubiera cesado la suspensión aplicada?. Entendemos que la modificación de los instrumentos convencionales no puede realizarse sin el consentimiento de Paraguay mientras no cese su calidad de Estado Parte de los mismos, pues constituiría una clara violación de los principios que regulan el Derecho de los Tratados y de la Convención de Viena de 1961 sobre la materia, vigente para los cuatro Estados. Asimismo, reiteramos, la Decisión de 29 de junio no contiene la fundamentación que requeriría la adopción de sanciones tan graves como la aplicada a Paraguay. Creemos que ha existido una gran improvisación que en nada contribuye al afianzamiento de este proceso de integración, sin entrar en la valoración de los hechos acontecidos en Paraguay y su relación con la sanción aplicada, tema este que como lo anticipáramos merecería por sí solo un detenido estudio. Por otra parte, nos preguntamos si ha sido adecuada la equiparación que realiza el Protocolo de Ushuaia de los Estados Parte del Mercosur con los Estados Asociados, que habilita a estos últimos a aplicar determinadas sanciones a los primeros. Queda también en duda los efectos que pudieran derivarse de la suspensión en relación a la representación de Paraguay y los derechos de ésta en el Parlamento del Mercosur. En nuestro entender, no la afectaría.
Retomando las observaciones sobre el Laudo del TPR de 21 de julio, es necesario destacar que la presentación de Paraguay ante el Tribunal tenía por objeto solicitar la aplicación de una medida excepcional de urgencia de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 24 del Protocolo de Olivos(4), a los efectos de que: 1) se declarara inaplicable la decisión de suspender a Paraguay de participar en los órganos del Mercosur y, 2) se declarada inaplicable la declaración que incorporaba a la República Bolivariana de Venezuela como miembro pleno del Mercosur. La competencia del Tribunal se fundaba en el art. 2, inc. b de la Decisión 23/04(5) y subsidiariamente, en el artículo 1, y en el 23 del PO referente al acceso directo en única instancia al TPR(6 ).
Paraguay sostiene, en la acción promovida, que el día 22 de junio de 2012 el Senado Paraguayo destituyó al entonces presidente Fernando Lugo Méndez, como consecuencia de un juicio político llevado a cabo de conformidad con lo establecido en el art. 225 de su Constitución, agregando que en la noche de ese mismo día el presidente depuesto aceptó la decisión del Congreso. La demanda reseña también los hechos producidos en el seno del Mercosur con motivo de aquel acontecimiento y reclama por la gravedad de las medidas adoptadas en le Cumbre de Presidentes, las que causaban un gravamen irreparable por el hecho de que le impedían ejercer sus derechos soberanos e inalienables como Estado fundador del Mercosur.
Alega igualmente, que la referida suspensión no se efectuó mediante una norma emanada de los órganos enumerados en el Protocolo de Ouro Preto ni en aplicación de las fuentes jurídicas enunciadas en el art. 41 del mencionado Protocolo, y cuestiona la legalidad de los Jefes de Estado para adoptar decisiones obligatorias en razón de que las cumbres presidenciales no constituyen ni integran los órganos del Mercosur y que las decisiones no se ajustan a su normativa.
Asimismo Paraguay considera que no se había producido ruptura alguna del orden democrático y que no se habían realizado las consultas previas previstas en el Artículo 4 del Protocolo de Ushuaia.
En cuanto a la incorporación de Venezuela como miembro pleno, Paraguay alega esencialmente que no se había contado con su participación como Miembro Pleno del Mercosur y la falta de unanimidad requerida para la toma de decisiones de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el art. 20 del Tratado de Asunción, y la inobservancia de lo consignado en el art. 40 del Protocolo de Ouro Preto sobre vigencia simultánea de las normas emanadas de los órganos del Mercosur. Alega para sustentar su postura normas y principios del derecho internacional, que violarían la decisión adoptada por los presidentes, como así también la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados de 1969. Paraguay estima que las decisiones objeto de la acción promovida adolecen de falta de motivación, y que ellas generan responsabilidad internacional por incumplimiento del sistema normativo del Mercosur y otras normas y principios de derecho internacional.
Afirma Paraguay asimismo, que recurre en forma directa al Tribunal por las razones ya apuntadas, ya que las demás instancias a las que podría recurrir dentro del sistema de solución de controversias del Mercosur quedarían excluidas como consecuencia de la suspensión y la imposibilidad de participación de sus representantes en los órganos que deberían intervenir para conformar el procedimiento.
Los tres países accionados respondieron en forma conjunta. En primer lugar, plantearon la excepción preliminar de incompetencia ratione materiae del Tribunal, arguyendo que la decisión cuestionada en el marco de Protocolo de Ushuaia y del sistema de solución de controversias del Mercosur “era de naturaleza comercial”. Igualmente los Estados accionados sostuvieron que entendían que la democracia era condición sine qua non para el desarrollo de proceso de integración y que el Protocolo de Ushuaia escapaba al sistema de solución de controversias del Mercosur y en consecuencia que la decisión de suspender a Paraguay con sustento en el Artículo. 5 del Protocolo de Ushuaia no podía ser examinada por el Tribunal Permanente de Revisión.
La segunda cuestión preliminar esgrimida, se fundaba en la inadecuación de la vía escogida en razón de que los casos de urgencia previstos en el art. 24 del Protocolo de Olivos no eran extensibles al objeto de la presentación de Paraguay, dado que este precepto contemplaba casos específicos de naturaleza comercial. La tercera cuestión preliminar aducía que Paraguay no había iniciado las negociaciones directas previas. y que carecía del consentimiento de los Estados accionados para el ejercicio de la competencia originaria conforme al art. 23 del Protocolo de Olivos.
En cuanto al fondo de la cuestión, los accionados sostuvieron que el procedimiento para aplicar el art. 5 del Protocolo de Ushuaia no preveía ningún “rito solemne” ni “formalidades” y que las medidas adoptadas habían sido “de naturaleza estrictamente política”. Asimismo arguyeron la legalidad de la suspensión aplicada a Paraguay en razón de que “realizaron consultas previas con diversos actores políticos paraguayos a los que solicitaron sea respetado el derecho de defensa y la garantía del debido proceso”. Reivindicaron la competencia de los Jefes de Estado para adoptar la decisión de marras, en razón de que el Protocolo de Ushuaia no establece nada al respecto y alegaron que la ruptura del orden democrático se había producido por la destitución del presidente de ese país mediante un procedimiento sumarísimo que no respetaba el debido proceso.
Mientras sesionaba el Tribunal, Paraguay presentó un escrito de Solicitud de Medidas Provisionales invocando el Artículo. 15 del Protocolo de Olivos(7) y los Artículos 29(8) y 39(9) del Reglamento de Protocolo de Olivos.
El Tribunal en su laudo, pasó a examinar las alegaciones de las partes en la controversia. En lo que respecta a la competencia del Tribunal ratione matereae, éste señala que si bien no existe en el Protocolo de Ushuaia indicación expresa de foro para la solución de controversias ni en cuanto a su aplicación e interpretación, en el Preámbulo de este instrumento convencional se indica que se encuentra vinculado al “conjunto normativo del Mercosur”(10). Más aún, destaca que el Artículo 8 determina expresamente que el Protocolo es parte integrante del Tratado de Asunción y de los respectivos Acuerdos de integración celebrados entre el Mercosur y las Repúblicas de Bolivia y de Chile.
El Tribunal, sostiene que, por lo tanto el sistema de solución de controversias establecido para el Mercosur abarca las normas de Protocolo de Ushuaia “en la medida en que afecten o puedan afectar derechos y obligaciones de cualquiera de los Estados Parte”(11). Por lo tanto, sigue, es indiscutible el derecho del Estado Parte a recurrir a ese sistema cuando considere que se han vulnerado sus derechos en aplicación de las normas del Protocolo de Ushuaia. Cerrando la cuestión, el Tribunal concluye “que la observancia de la legalidad de los procedimientos previstos en el PU son susceptibles de revisión en el marco del sistema de solución de controversias del Mercosur. Lo mismo se aplica a cuestionamientos relacionados a la aplicación e interpretación de dicho Protocolo, en la medida en que el hecho concreto, por su naturaleza, demande un examen de legalidad”.
Confirmada la competencia del Tribunal para entender en la cuestión planteada por Paraguay, pasa a considerar la cuestión de las medidas excepcionales de urgencia invocadas por este país. Expuestas las posiciones antagónicas de las partes en cuanto a los requisitos que deben concurrir para la procedencia de dichas medidas, el Tribunal recuerda que en el Protocolo de Olivos las Partes acordaron –artículo 24-, que el Consejo Mercado Común podría establecer procedimientos especiales para atender casos excepcionales de urgencia que pudieran ocasionar daños irreparables a las Partes, y que esta posibilidad fue reglamentada por la Decisión 23/04 de este órgano, que previó los procedimientos para atender tales casos(12). El Tribunal destaca que al enunciarse los requisitos para habilitar la vía prevista, la Decisión del CMC no aclaró si esos requisitos eran independientes o cumulativos, lo que le obligaba a la lectura del resto del texto de la referida Decisión para efectuar una correcta interpretación. “A partir de ello –dice- se observan dos menciones que ayudan a esa interpretación: a) el art. 6 de la Decisión 23/04 menciona “todos los requisitos establecidos”; b) el art. 52, indica que el incumplimiento de algunos requisitos no impide que el demandante inicie un nuevo procedimiento”. El Tribunal sostiene que él no puede sustituir la voluntad de los Estados manifestada en los requisitos esenciales de la Decisión 23/04 que limitan la competencia del TPR en relación al procedimiento excepcional de urgencia. Acogiendo la tesis de los accionados, reafirma que no puede entender en la materia por medio de este procedimiento(13).
Dilucidado este aspecto de la litis, el Tribunal pasó a examinar las posturas divergentes de la partes en cuanto a la cuestión del acceso directo al tribunal. Paraguay había solicitado que el Tribunal entendiera por esta vía con base a lo previsto en los Artículos 1 y 23 del PO, y que en razón de los hechos que motivara la presentación, se consideraran cumplidos los requisitos de este último dispositivo. Los accionados negaron que se hubiera cumplido con tales requisitos y en particular que Paraguay hubiera demostrado haber intentado negociaciones directas con los demandados.
El Tribunal recuerda que el PO permite el acceso directo sin el cumplimiento de la fase anterior del tribunal arbitral ad hoc, cuando las partes en la controversia hubieran acordado someterse directamente en única instancia el TPR. Este consentimiento, según el Tribunal, no se había producido. “El consentimiento de las partes – dice el Tribunal- configura condición fundamental para el ejercicio de la legitimidad jurisdiccional del TPR, al contrario del proceso ordinario, en cuyo caso este consentimiento ya se dio al momento de firmar la incorporación del PO. Se puede comprender el argumento de Paraguay de que el acceso a la jurisdicción directa es la vía necesaria para suspender un acto arbitrario, sobre el cual ni siquiera fue instado a manifestarse. Pero, sin el consentimiento expreso, no puede el TPR anteponerse al texto del PO, a pesar de los daños que la demora en el proceso decisorio ordinario pueda causar a Paraguay o a la estabilidad jurídico-institucional de la región”(14).
El Tribunal aborda después la cuestión de las negociaciones directas como fase necesaria en el proceso de solución de controversias en el Mercosur, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Artículo 4 del PO. Paraguay había argumentado que se trataba de una exigencia de cumplimiento imposible toda vez que había sido suspendido del Mercosur, sin tener derecho de defensa. El Tribunal reitera la necesidad de cumplir con esta etapa procesal, sosteniendo – y esto es muy importante- que si Paraguay hubiera solicitado negociaciones directas y éstas hubieran sido rechazadas “tendríamos una situación distinta”(15).
Case destacar que en esta cuestión hubo una opinión minoritaria en el Tribunal. Más allá de una interpretación diferente sobre las medidas excepcionales y de urgencia, tal posición destacaba que si los Estados Parte demandados, a través de sus Jefes de Estado habían adoptado una decisión que excluía a Paraguay de participar en los órganos del Mercosur, y si el Estado afectado no podía iniciar los procedimientos para una instancia previa al TPR, resultaba admisible considerar que estaría habilitado a recurrir de forma directa y no necesariamente por la vía de la Decisión 23/04 en situaciones excepcionales de urgencia y que si la suspensión no excluía la condición de Paraguay de Estado Parte, eran inadmisibles situaciones en que se desconociera por vía de hecho esta condición o que se impidiera o imposibilitara su acceso al sistema jurisdiccional previsto para el Mercosur(16).
De allí que en la parte resolutiva, se consigna –punto 3- que por mayoría “el Tribunal Permanente de Revisión decide que, en las condiciones de la actual demanda, resulta inadmisible la intervención directa del TPR sin el consentimiento expreso de los demás Estados Parte. Por la misma razón, considera el TPR inadmisible, en esta instancia, la medida provisional solicitada en el marco de la demanda”. En el punto siguiente, por unanimidad y sin entrar al fondo de la demanda, el TPR no se pronuncia “sobre el cumplimiento o la violación de la normativa Mercosur en relación con la demanda planteada en este procedimiento”, y afirma que la decisión del Tribunal no inhibía otros medios a los que pudieran acudir los Estados Parte en el marco del sistema de solución de controversias del Mercosur”.
Sin pretender efectuar un examen exhaustivo del laudo emitido por el Tribunal Permanente de Revisión, estimamos que el mismo – al margen de la discrepancia puesta de manifiesto en cuanto al acceso directo al Tribunal ya reseñada, que es una cuestión opinable -, sienta una jurisprudencia que contribuye a afianzar el marco jurídico en que debe sustentarse el proceso de integración iniciado en 1991. Hubiera sido preocupante, que se admitiera la postura de los países accionados que alegaron que la aplicación del Protocolo de Ushuaia y la interpretación de sus normas eran materias que estaban excluidas del control jurisdiccional del TPR, y más aún la negación de la jurisdicción fundada en que se trataba de una cuestión “de naturaleza política”. También es interesante que el Tribunal haya reconocido que quedaban abiertos otros medios a los que los Estados Parte pudieran recurrir en el marco del sistema de solución de controversias instituido en el Mercosur, y que señalara que otro podría haber sido el pronunciamiento si se hubieran observado o cumplido con algunas de las instancias previas al recurso planteado ante el Tribunal.
El Tribunal Permanente de Revisión no se pronunció en relación a la acción promovida por el ingreso de Venezuela como Miembro Pleno del Mercosur.
También, un análisis de la cuestión originada por la suspensión de Paraguay y de las circunstancias que condujeron a adoptar esta determinación, ha puesto en evidencia las falencias del Protocolo de Ushuaia que deja abiertas demasiadas puertas por las que pueden filtrase la arbitrariedad, más allá de que se pudieran adoptar decisiones sin cumplirse con los procedimientos establecidos en el propio Protocolo.
En suma, estimamos que la situación planteada por la suspensión aplicada a Paraguay, por las circunstancias que condujeron a esta determinación por los otros tres países miembros del Mercosur, y la decisión de efectivizar el ingreso de Venezuela sin haberse completado el procedimiento prescripto en la normativa convencional aplicable al caso, son hechos que en nada contribuyen a consolidar este proceso de integración que de por sí afronta dificultades que hacen cada vez más dudosa la posibilidad de que se alcancen los objetivos fundacionales.
* Catedrático de Derecho Internacional Público. Profesor Emérito de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (R.A.)
NOTAS
(1) Cf. Mercosur, Tribunal Permanente de Revisión, Laudo Nº 1/2012.
(2) Cf. “Decisión sobre la Suspensión del Paraguay en el Mercosur en aplicación del Protocolo de Ushuaia sobre Compromiso Democrático”.
(3) Cf.. “Declaración de los Estados Partes del Mercosur y Estados Asociados sobre ruptura del orden democrático en Paraguay”
(4) Este dispositivo establece: “El Consejo Mercado Común podrá establecer procedimientos especiales para atender casos excepcionales de urgencia que pudieran ocasionar daños irreparables a las Partes”.
(5) Artículo 2, inc. b): “Que la situación se origine en acciones o medidas adoptadas por un Estado Parte, en violación o incumplimiento de la normativa Mercosur vigente”.
(6) Artículo 23: “1. Las partes en una controversia, culminado el procedimiento establecido en los artículos 4 y 5 de este Protocolo, podrán acordar expresamente someterse directamente y en única instancia al Tribunal Permanente de Revisión, en cuyo caso éste tendrá las mismas competencias que un Tribunal Arbitral Ad Hoc y regirán en lo pertinente, los artículos 9,12 13, 14, 15 y 16 del presente Protocolo. 2. En este supuesto los laudos del Tribunal Permanente de Revisión serán obligatorios para los Estados parte en la controversia a partir de la recepción de la respectiva notificación, no estarán sujetos a recurso de revisión y tendrán con relación a las fuerza de cosa juzgada.”
(7) El Artículo 15 sobre medidas provisionales, prescribe “1. El Tribunal Arbitral Ad Hoc podrá a solicitud de la parte interesada y en la medida que existan presunciones fundadas de que el mantenimiento de la situación pueda ocasionar daños graves e irreparables a una de las partes en la controversia, dictar las medidas provisionales que considere apropiadas para prevenir tales daños. 2. El Tribunal podrá, en cualquier momento, dejar sin efecto tales medidas. 3. En el caso de que el Laudo fuera objeto de recurso de revisión, las medidas provisionales que no hubiesen quedado sin efecto antes de dictarse el mismo, se mantendrán hasta su tratamiento en la primera reunión del Tribunal Permanente de Revisión, que deberá resolver sobre su continuidad o cese.”
(8) Artículo 29. Medidas Provisionales: “1. La solicitud al TAH de dictar medidas provisionales puede presentarse en cualquier momento después de la aceptación por el tercer árbitro de su designación. La parte interesada, en su pedido, deberá especificar los daños graves e irreparables que se intenta prevenir con la aplicación de medidas provisionales, los elementos que le permitan al Tribunal evaluar esos eventuales daños y las medidas provisionales que considere adecuadas. 2. La parte que solicita medidas provisionales notificará su pedido simultáneamente a la otra parte, la cual podrá presentar al TAH las consideraciones que estime pertinentes en un plazo máximo de cinco(5) días contados a partir de la fecha de notificación. 3. Las medidas provisionales dictadas por el TAH deberán ser cumplidas en el plazo determinado por éste debiendo la parte obligada informarle acerca de su cumplimiento. 4. El TPR, al pronunciarse sobre la continuidad o cese de las medidas provisionales dictadas por el TSH, deberá notificar de inmediato su decisión a las partes”.
(9) Art. 39. Acceso directo al Tribunal Permanente de Revisión (Art. 23 PO): “1. Los Estados partes en una controversia que acuerden someterse directamente y en única instancia al TPR, deberán comunicarlo por escrito a dicho Tribunal a través de la ST, con copia a la SM. 2. El mencionado Tribunal actuará con la totalidad de sus miembros cuando funcione en única instancia. 3. En este caso, el funcionamiento del TPR estará regulado, en lo pertinente, por lo dispuesto en los artículos 18; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 30; 34; 40 y 41 de este Reglamento. Las funciones atribuidas a la SM en dichas normas serán cumplidas por la ST. Las comunicaciones entre las partes y el TPR deberán ser tramitadas con copia a la SM”.
(10) v. párr. 40.
( 11) v. párr. 43.
(12) La Decisión establece en el Art. 2: “Cualquier Estado Parte podrá recurrir ante el Tribunal Permanente de Revisión (TPR) bajo el procedimiento establecido en la presente Decisión siempre que se cumplan los siguientes requisitos: a. que se trate de bienes perecederos, estacionales o que por su naturaleza y características propias perdieran sus propiedades, utilidad y/o valor comercial en un breve periodo de tiempo, si fueran retenidos injustificadamente en el territorio del país demandado; o de bienes que estuviesen destinados a atender demandas originadas en situaciones de crisis en el Estado importador; b. que la situación se origine en acciones o medidas adoptadas por el Estado Parte en violación o incumplimiento de la normativa Mercosur vigente; c. que el mantenimiento de esas acciones o medidas puedan producir daños graves e irreparables; d. que las acciones o medidas cuestionadas no estén siendo objeto de una controversia en curso entre las partes involucradas”.
(13) v. párr. 52.
(14) v. párr 58.
(15) v. párr. 60.
(16) v. párrafos 62,63 y 64.
Traducción - español
SUSPENSION OF A MEMBER STATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION ORGANIZATION . MERCOSUR
by Ernesto J. Rey Caro
Suspension of a member State from an international integration organization is not something common. Moreover, there are few precedents and each of them has its own peculiarities. This is the reason why, such events capture the attention of scholars and they deserve some particular consideration. We will focus attention on the suspension of Paraguay as full Member of Mercosur.
On 21 July, 2012, the Permanent Review Court of Mercosur pronounced on the emergency procedure requested by the Republic of Paraguay in relation to the suspension of its participation in the organs of the Southern Common Market and the admissibility of Venezuela as a full Member (1).
The situation which originated Paraguay´s request began with Fernando Lugo´s removal from office by the Senate of the Republic of Paraguay with previous participation of the House of Representatives, and with Federico Franco assuming power in his place. This took place on 22nd June, of the same year.
Certainly, in the summit that took place in the city of Mendoza, by the end of June, 2012, Presidents of the Member States of Mercosur, adopted a Decision on 29th June. The Decision stated “1. To suspend the Republic of Paraguay from the right to participate in the Mercosur organs and from the deliberations, under the terms of article 5 of the Ushuaia Protocol” (2). The grounds state that, in compliance with this Protocol, on Democratic Commitment, full life of the democratic institutions is an essential condition for the development of the integration process and that any breach of the democratic order constitutes “an unacceptable obstacle for the continuity of the integration process”. In like manner, it points out that in compliance with the foundation treaties of Mercosur, the suspension brought about limitation to Paraguay in its participation in the organs, “as well as the loss of the rights of vote and veto”. The “Declaration of the Member States of Mercosur and Associated States on the breach of the democratic order in Paraguay” was also mentioned. The declaration was issued on 24th June of the same year (3).
The decision above mentioned also states that: “2. As long as the suspension lasts, whatever stated in subsection iii), article 40 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto will take effect with the incorporation ( of the norms approved by the organs of Mercosur) provided by Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, in compliance with subsection ii), of said article”, and that the suspension will cease – paragraph 3- when in compliance with the provisions of article 7 of the Ushuaia Protocol, full re-establishment of the democratic order in the party affected has been verified. The Foreign Ministers will maintain regular contact in this respect. It is also agreed to communicate the present decision to the MERCOSUR parliament.
It is important to note down that the Declaration of June 24th, undersigned by the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Uruguay, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Bolivian Pluri-national State, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Ecuador and the republic of Peru, pointed up that according to the Ushuaia Protocol of 1998, the life of the democratic institutions was an essential condition for the development of the integration process, and the decision expressed, in the first place, “the most energetic condemn to the breach of the democratic order in the Republic of Paraguay because it did not apply due process” and “ to immediately suspend Paraguay and thereupon, to suspend it from the right to participate in the XLIII Meeting of the Common Market Council and in the Summit of Mercosur Presidents, as well as from the preparatory meetings that will be held in the city of Mendoza, between 25th and 29th June, 2012”. Paragraph 3, states that other measures would be later adopted in the Summit of Mercosur Heads of State.
Together with the abovementioned Decision, of June 29Th, Presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay signed a “Declaration” that ruled, in its first paragraph: “The admissibility of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in Mercosur” and it summoned to a special meeting on 31st June, 2012, for the “official admissibility of this country in Mercosur. In the third paragraph, it called for all the South American countries “to stay together in the present complex international scenery so that they deepen the growth and inclusion process that has taken place in our region in the last decade and to act as an economic and social stability factor in an environment where democracy in the continent is in full force”.
Therefore, it is observed that the events that took place in Paraguay gave rise to two decisions in Mercosur. On the one hand, the suspension of Paraguay under the said terms and, on the other, the admissibility of Venezuela as Full Member. Notwithstanding the fact that on 24th June, a first suspension had been applied, by virtue of which, Paraguay´s participation in Mendoza Summit was denied.
From the facts, we can see that the main instrument used to support the decision to suspend Paraguay, was the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment in Mercosur, July 1998, signed by the four Member States, the Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Chile.
This instrument, states- article 2- , that “it will apply to relations deriving from the respective integration Agreements in force among States Parties to the present Protocol, in case of the breach of democratic order in any of them” and if such an event took place –article 3- it will “produce the application of the procedures envisaged in the following articles”. These procedures and the way the corresponding measures will be adopted, have been regulated in articles 4, 5 and 6.
In the first place- article 4-, in the case of a “breach” of the democratic order in a State Party, “the other States Parties shall promote the relevant consultations among themselves and with the State concerned”. If such consultations- article 5- were not successful, the other State Parties to the Protocol, under the integration Agreements in force among them, “will consider the nature and the scope of the measures to be applied, considering the seriousness of the existing situation”. Such measures, in compliance with this same instrument “may range from suspension of the right to participate in the organs of the respective integration processes to the suspension of the rights and obligations deriving from such processes”. The measures referred to in article 5 are taken by common consensus and are notified to the State “concerned”, which will not participate in the corresponding decision making process. These measures will enter into force on the date of notification. The measures will cease to be applicable–article7- as on the date the State concerned is notified that the States which took such measures, have agreed “that it has been verified that the democratic order has been fully restored” and this will take place as soon as restoration takes place.
From the analysis of the situation and the instrument invoked for the suspension, there are some issues which have to be specially considered.
In the first place, in the decisions taken on June 24th and June 29th, there is no expressed reference to the concrete events that support these decisions. Only the “breach of democratic order” and “the fact that due process has not been respected” are mentioned broadly. We could infer that the interruption of the democratic order was the result of not having respected due process in Lugo´s destitution, but there is no reference to this. Such measures, which imply the suspension of the State Party, under the Ushuaia Protocol, according to our opinion, should have been adequately supported and the facts expressly mentioned, notwithstanding the assessment that each State Party that takes part in the decision could make.
However, what is most worrying is that the procedure stated in the Protocol has not been respected. The Protocol calls for consultation with “the concerned State”. Paradoxically, the resolution that suspends Paraguay” because due process was not respected”, violates the “due process” that the conventional instrument applied prescribes.
Another consequence derived from the suspension applied to Paraguay, is the admissibility of Venezuela. Indeed, the ´terms under the Protocol of Asuncion, are clear in this point, since in the case of adherence to the treaty- Article 20, last part- they state that approbation of request will be object to “the unanimous decision of the States Parties”. The legal force of this instrument is expressly reiterated in the Framework Agreement for the Adhesion of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to Mercosur, December 8th, 2005.
The fact that Paraguay had still not given the necessary consent required under the Treaty of Asuncion is well known. The suspension has not deprived it from its condition of State Party and Member of Mercosur. Therefore, the Resolution from June 29th,, adopted by the other three States of the Mercosur, for incorporating Venezuela is a clear violation of the Treaty of 1991.
It is noteworthy to mention that the Protocol of Montevideo, also known as Ushuaia II, undersigned in December 2011, and which has not entered into force yet, apart from having a wider range of application seems to be a more complete instrument. This Protocol will apply- Article 1- in case of “breach or threat of breach against the institutional order, of violation of constitutional order or any other situation that risks the legitimate exercise of power and the legal force of democratic values and principles”. It enumerates the authorities or competent organs to intervene, and their place of meeting- Article 2-; the procedure to follow- Articles 3,4,5- and something important to point out: there is also a catalogue of measures that can be adopted. These measures are: to suspend the right to participate in the different organs of the institutional structure of Mercosur; to close land borders totally or partially, to suspend or limit trade, air and maritime traffic, communications and energy supply, services and supplies; to suspend the concerned Party from enjoying the rights and benefits emerging from the Treaty of Asuncion and its Protocols and from the integration treaties celebrated among the Parties, to promote the suspension of the Party concerned in the scope of other regional and international organizations; to promote before third countries or groups of countries, the suspension of the Party concerned, from the rights and/or benefits deriving from cooperation agreements of which it may be part of; to support regional and international efforts, especially in the United Nations framework; aimed at solving and finding a pacific and democratic solution to a situation occurring in the Party concerned; and to adopt additional political and diplomatic sanctions. It states that such measures “shall be proportionally adequate for the seriousness of the existing situation, they shall not risk the peoples´ welfare and their effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Party concerned; to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Party concerned, the situation of the countries with no maritime boundaries and the treaties in force”. Other norms state the way of application of the decisions adopted, their legal force, end of their application, etc. It is not the aim of this work to analyse this instrument, which by itself, deserves a detailed study of its virtues and also of the numerous doubts that arise from a deep reading. It has only been mentioned to stress the silence and absence of prevention in the Protocol of Ushuaia.
Another issue which gives rise to a lot of questioning deriving from the regulations of the Heads of States´ Decision, of June 29th, is the norm in paragraph 2 that refers to subsections ii and iii, Article 40 of the Ouro Preto Protocol, to be applied during the period of suspension applied to Paraguay. Indeed, in compliance with such term, it will be possible to incorporate norms without Paraguay´s participation. If they are norms that have been approved with the participation of this country- which has not ceased to be a State Party in the Treaty of Asuncion, the Ouro Preto Protocol and in all the other Agreements-, but which have not yet been incorporated, that determination is clearly violating said Article 40, since it rules that “when all the States have informed of the incorporation to their respective internal legal systems, the Secretariat of Mercosur will notify this to each State Party”. Has this been the aim of the States that applied the sanction? Besides, there is another question in relation to whether that norm, which was incorporated only with the participation of the three States that applied the sanction, could produce effect in relation to Paraguay. In like manner, if that determination included in the Decision, referred to norms that could be approved during the suspension, that is to say, approved without the participation of Paraguay, because its participation in the organs of Mercosur is suspended, we would find ourselves before a “right” applicable only to one part of the State Members of Mercosur. We also wonder if they would be legally binding for Paraguay once the suspension had come to an end. We understand that the modification of the conventional instruments cannot be done without Paraguay´s consent, as long as it remains being a State Party, since this would constitute a clear violation of the principles governing the Law of Treaties and the Vienna Convention of 1961 on this matter, in force for the four States. In like manner, we repeat, the Decision of June 29th does not have the required grounds that the adoption of such serious measures as applied to Paraguay would demand. We believe that there has been great improvisation, which does not contribute to strengthening this integration process, without judging the events that took place in Paraguay and their relation with the sanction imposed. As stated before, this issue by itself would deserve detailed study. We also wonder if the equal treatment that the Ushuaia Protocol gives to the State Parties of Mercosur and the Associate States is adequate, since it allows the latter to apply certain sanctions to the former. We also have doubts about the effects that could derive from the suspension in relation to the representation of Paraguay and its rights in the Mercosur Parliament. In our opinion, this would not affect it.
Going back to the remarks about the PRC´s Arbitration Award of July 21st, it is necessary to point rgency measure in compliance with what article 24, of the Olivos Protocol prescribes (4) so that: 1) the decision to suspend Paraguay from participating in up that Paraguay´s appearance in Court was aimed at applying for an exceptional emethe organs of the Mercosur was declared inapplicable and, 2) that the declaration that incorporated the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as full Member of Mercosur was declared inapplicable. The Court´s competence was based on article.2, subsection b of the 04/23 Decision (5) and collaterally, in article 1 and in article 23 of the OP, referring to the direct admission in unique instance to the PRC (6).
In the action Paraguay, holds that on 22nd June, 2012, the Paraguayan Senate removed president Fernando Lugo Méndez from office, after impeachment under article 225, of his constitution, adding that the night of that same day, the president removed, accepted Congress´ decision. The file also contains the events that took place within Mercosur as a consequence of that event and complains about the seriousness of the measures taken in the Presidents Summit. The measures caused irreparable damage because they deprived Paraguay of exercising its vested and sovereign rights, as a Mercosur founding State.
It also invokes, that the said suspension is not supported by a norm emanated from the organs mentioned in the Ouro Preto Protocol, nor by the application of the legal sources stated in article 41 of this Protocol and it questions the legitimacy of the Heads of State to take binding decisions since the Presidents Summits neither constitute nor form part of the organs of Mercosur and that the decisions do not comply with their regulations.
Paraguay considers that it had not caused a breach of the democratic order and that the previous consultations prescribed in Article 4 of the Ushuaia Protocol had not been made.
As regards the incorporation of Venezuela as full member, Paraguay essentially claims that its participation as Full Member of Mercosur had not been considered, and the lack of unanimous consensus necessary for taking decisions under Article 20 of the Treaty of Asuncion, and the non-compliance with what Article 40 of the Ouro Preto Protocol states about the simultaneous legal force of the norms emanated from the organs of Mercosur. To support its position, it invokes norms and principles of international law, which would violate the Presidents ´decision as well as the Vienna Convention about the Law of Treaties of 1969. Paraguay believes that the decisions which are object of the action lack motivation and they imply international legal liability because there is non- compliance with the regulatory system of Mercosur and of other norms and principles of international law.
Paraguay holds that it resorts directly to the Court because of the reasons already mentioned, since all the other instances it could resort to, under the system for the settlement of disputes in Mercosur, would be excluded as a result of the suspension and the impossibility of its representatives to participate in the organs that should intervene to comply with the proceeding.
The three defendant countries answered together. In the first place, they filed the preliminary exception of incompetence of ratione materiae of the Court, on the basis that the decision questioned in the framework of the Ushuaia Protocol and in the system for the settlement of disputes “was of a commercial nature”. In the same way the defendant States held that democracy was the sine qua non condition for the development of the integration process and that the Ushuaia Protocol was out of the scope of the system for the settlement of disputes of the Mercosur. Therefore the decision to suspend Paraguay under Article 5 of the Ushuaia Protocol could not be examined by the Permanent Review Court.
The second question set forth, was based on the inappropriateness of the mechanism chosen since the urgent cases prescribed in article 24 of the Olivos Protocol did not apply to the object of Paraguay´s presentation, because this provision referred to specific cases of commercial nature.
The third preliminary question stated that Paraguay had not started the prior direct negotiations and that it did not have the consent of the defendant States for the exercise of the original competence under article 23 of the Olivos Protocol.
As regards the merits of the case, the defendant countries held that the procedure to apply article 5 of the Ushuaia Protocol, did not prescribe any “solemn rite” or any “formalities” and that the measures taken had been of “strict political nature”. In like manner, they argued the legality of the suspension of Paraguay because they stated that “they had made previous consultations to various Paraguayan political actors and that they had asked them to respect the right to defence and the procedural safeguards: due process”. They claimed for the Heads of State´s competence to adopt such decision since the Ushuaia Protocol does not prescribe anything about this issue and they claimed that the breach of the democratic order was due to the destitution of that country´s president by means of a summary proceeding which did not respect due process.
While the Court was in session, Paraguay submitted a writ Applying for Provisional Measures, under Article 15 of the Olivos Protocol (7) and Articles 29 (8) and 39(9) of the Olivos Protocol´s Regulations.
In its arbitration award, the Court examined the allegations produced by the parties involved. As regards the Court´s competence ratione matereae , the Court points up that in spite of the fact that in the Protocol of Ushuaia there is no expressed mention of a forum for the settlement of disputes nor for its application and interpretation, the Preamble of this conventional instrument expresses that it is connected with the “legal framework of Mercosur” (10). Moreover, it points out that Article 8 expressly states that the Protocol is part of the Treaty of Asuncion and of the respective integration Agreements celebrated among Mercosur and the Republics of Bolivia and Chile.
The Court holds that, as a consequence, the system for the settlement of disputes established by Mercosur includes the norms of the Protocol of Ushuaia “as long as they affect or may affect the rights and obligations of any of the Sates Parties” (11). Therefore, it continues, the right of the State Party to resort to this system, when it considers that its rights, in compliance with the Protocol of Ushuaia, have been violated, is not a matter of discussion. To finish this analysis, the Court concludes “that observance of the legality of the proceedings prescribed in the PU is susceptible of revision under the framework of the system for the settlement of disputes of Mercosur. The same applies to the questioning related to the application and interpretation of said Protocol, as long as the concrete fact deserves an analysis of its legality because of its nature.
After acceptance of the Court´s competence to have jurisdiction over the issue concerning Paraguay, it turns its attention to the consideration of the extraordinary urgent measures invoked by this country. After the Parties have presented their opposite views as regards the requirements that must be present for the appropriateness of such measures, the Court mentions that in the Olivos Protocol, the Parties agreed- article 24-that the Council of the Common Market could set special proceedings for exceptional urgent cases that could cause irreparable damage to the Parties and that this possibility was ruled by the Decision 04/23, of this organ, which stated the proceedings to have jurisdiction over such cases (12). The Court points out that when the Decision of the CCM enunciated the admissibility requirements, it did not make it clear if these requirements were independent or accumulative, so for a correct interpretation, it was necessary to read the rest of the text of the said Decision. “Thereafter- it states-there are two things that help the interpretation: a) Art. 6 of the Decision 04/23 mentions “all the established requirements2; b) Article 52 indicates that the non-observance of some of the requirements does not imply that the defendant brings a new action”. The Court holds that it cannot substitute the States’ will shown in the necessary requirements of Decision 04/23 which limit the jurisdiction of the PRC in relation to the exceptional urgent proceeding. According to the views of the defendant countries, it reaffirms that it does not have jurisdiction over the matter by means of this proceeding.
After working on this aspect of the conflict, the Court continued to examine the contrary positions of the parts about the direct access to the court. Paraguay had resorted to the Court to exercise jurisdiction through this mechanism, in compliance with Articles 1 and 23 of the OP, and that due to the facts that originated the presentation, the requirements of this last mechanism were considered as met. The defendant countries denied that the requirements had been met, and particularly, that Paraguay had demonstrated to have had intentions of direct negotiations with the defendant countries
The Court mentions that the OP allows direct access without compliance with the prior stage of the Ad Hoc Arbitration Court, when the parties in conflict had agreed to abide by the PRC directly in a unique instance. According to the Court, there had been no such consent. “The parties´ consent, says the Court- is a fundamental condition to exercise the jurisdictional legality of the PRC. This is different from an ordinary process, where this consent has already been given at the moment of signing the incorporation to the OP. We can understand Paraguay´s argument that access to direct jurisdiction is the necessary mechanism to suspend an arbitrary measure, about which it was not even asked to make a statement. However, without expressed consent, the PRC cannot precede the OP, in spite of the damages that the delay in the ordinary decision making process could cause to Paraguay or to the judicial-institutional stability of the region”.(14)
Later, the Court addresses the question of direct negotiations as a necessary stage in the process for the settlement of disputes in Mercosur, in compliance with Article 4 of the OP. Paraguay had contended that it was a requirement impossible to be enforced since it had been suspended from Mercosur, without right of defence. The Court reiterates the necessity to respect this procedural stage, and it holds –and this is very important- that if Paraguay had applied for direct negotiations and these negotiations had been denied “we would have a different situation”. (15)
It is important to stress that in this issue there was a minority of opinions in the Court. Further from a different interpretation about the extraordinary urgent measures, such a position pointed up that if the defendant State Parties, through their Heads of State, had adopted a decision that suspended Paraguay from participating in the organs of the Mercosur, and if the State concerned could not bring the case to another procedure before resorting to the PRC, it was admissible to consider that it would be allowed to resort to in a direct way and not necessarily respecting the mechanisms of the Decision 04/23, in extraordinary urgent situations and that if the suspension did not exclude Paraguay as a Member State, it was inadmissible to accept situations which ignored this condition through mechanism of fact or that did not allow or that made its access to the jurisdictional system prescribed for Mercosur impossible.(16)
Thereupon, the decision states –item 3- that by majority “the PRC decides that, according to the conditions of the present file, the direct intervention of the PRC without the expressed consent of the other State Parties is considered inadmissible. For this same reason, the PRC considers that, in this instance, the provisional measure applied in the framework of the file is inadmissible”. In the next item, unanimously and without considering the merits of the file, el PRC does not pronounce “on the compliance or violation of the Mercosur´s regulations in relation to the file in this proceeding” and affirms that the Court´s decision did not restrain other mechanisms to which the State Members could resort to in the framework of the system for the settlement of disputes.
Without intending to do an exhaustive analysis of the arbitral award of the Permanent Review Court and in spite of the discrepancy about the direct access to the Permanent Review Court, which is something questionable, we believe that it sets precedent and that it contributes to strengthen the legal framework which must support the integration process that began in 1991 . It would have been worrying to admit the position of the defendant countries which pleaded that the application of the Ushuaia Protocol and the interpretation of its norms were excluded from the jurisdictional control of the PRC, and moreover, denial of the jurisdiction on the basis that it was “of a political nature”. It is also interesting for the Court to have admitted that there were other mechanisms to which the State Parties could resort to in the framework of the system for the settlement of disputes of the Mercosur and that it had mentioned that the judgement could have been different if some of the instances prior to the petition to the Court had been observed or complied with.
The Permanent Review Court did not pronounce in relation to the action brought due to the admission of Venezuela as Full Member of Mercosur.
Also, an analysis of the conflict originated by Paraguay´s suspension and by the circumstances that led to this decision, has evidenced the faults of the Ushuaia Protocol, which is open to arbitrariness, apart from the decisions that could be taken without compliance with the proceedings stated in the Protocol itself.
Briefly, we believe that the situation originated by the suspension of Paraguay, by the circumstances that led to the decision taken by the other three State Members of Mercosur and by the decision to make Venezuela´s admissibility effective without having complied with the proceeding prescribed in the conventional regulations applicable to the case, are facts that did not contribute at all to consolidate this integration process, which by itself, is facing difficulties that raise doubts about the possibility of reaching the foundational objectives.
*Professor of Public International Law. Professor Emeritus of the National University of Cordoba ( A.R.)
Notes
(1) Cf. Mercosur, Permanent Review Court, Arbitration Award N° 1/2012.
(2) Cf. “Decision on the Suspension of Paraguay from the Mercosur in compliance with the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment”.
(3) Cf. “Declaration of the States Parties of Mercosur and the Associate States
on the breach of the democratic order in Paraguay”
(4) Cf. This mechanism states: “The Common Market Council may establish especial procedures to have jurisdiction over exceptional urgent cases that could cause irreparable damage to the Parties”
(5) Article 2, subsection b):”That the situation originates from actions or measures adopted by a State Party, violating or not complying with the Mercosur regulations in force”.
(6) Article 23: “1. After the proceeding established in Articles 4 and 5 of this Protocol has ended, the parties in conflict may expressly agree to abide by directly and in unique instance to the Permanent Review Court. In this case, this Court shall have the same competences as an Ad Hoc Arbitration Court and the Articles applicable in this matter will be Articles 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the present Protocol. 2. After the respective notification, the awards of the Permanent Review Court will be binding for the State parties of the conflict; they will not be subject to appeal for revision and they will have effect of res judicata.
(7) Article 15, about provisional measures, prescribes “1. The Ad Hoc Arbitration Court, after request by the party concerned, may order the provisional measures it considers appropriate in order to avoid damage, as long as there exists reasonable presumption that the situation may cause serious and irreparable damage to one of the parties in the conflict. 2. The Court may, at any moment, deprive such measures of any legal effect.3. In case the award was subject to revision, the provisional measures that were still in force before the award will continue to be in force until the Permanent Review Court addresses them in the first meeting. The Court shall decide about their continuance or termination.”
(8) Article 29. Provisional Measures: “1.The request to the AHC, to order provisional measures can be submitted at any moment after the third arbitrator has accepted the appointment. In its request, the party concerned, shall specify the serious and irreparable damage intended to avoid with the application of the provisional measures, the elements that will allow the Court to assess such possible damage and the provisional measures it considers appropriate.2. The party that requests the provisional measures shall notify the other party of its request simultaneously. The latter may submit to the AHC any considerations it finds relevant, no more than five (5) days after the day of notification. 3. The provisional measures ordered by the AHC shall be complied with within the time prescribed by the AHC. The liable party shall inform about the compliance with such measures. 4. After pronouncing on the continuance or termination of the provisional measures ordered by the AHC, The PRC shall immediately notify its decision to the parties”.
(9) Art. 39. Direct Access to the Permanent Review Court (Art. 23 OP): “1. The State Parties, which in conflict, agree to abide by the PRC directly and in unique instance, shall notify such Court in written form, through the MS. 2. The said Court will take action with the totality of its members when acting in unique instance.3. In this case, the PRC´s functioning will be regulated, in the pertinent issues, by Articles 18;25;26;27;28;29,30;34,40 and 41 of this Regulation. The functions vested to the MS in such norms, will be complied with by the MS. The notifications among parties and the PRC shall go with true copy to the MS”.
(10) see. par.40.
(11) see. par. 43.
(12) The Decision states in Art.2: “Any State Party may resort to the Permanent Review Court (PRC) under the proceeding established in the present Decision, as long as the following requirements are present: a. that they are perishable goods, seasonal goods or that by their nature and particular characteristics they are goods that could lose properties, utility and/ or commercial value, in a short period of time, if they were unfairly delayed in the territory of the defendant country; or if they were goods destined to satisfy needs originating from a crisis in the importing State; b. that the situation was originated due to actions or measures adopted by the State Party under violation or non-compliance with the Mercosur ruling in force; c. that the continuance of those measures or actions could cause irreparable damage; d. that actions or measures under question were not the object of a conflict occurring among the Parties involved”.
(13) see. pár. 52.
(14) see. pár 58.
(15) see. pár. 60.
(16) see. paragraphs 62,63 y 64
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